

JPRS Report

Proliferation Issues

PROLIFERATION ISSUES

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MOZAMBIQUE

UN Report Confirms Renamo Chemical Agent Use

MB2207063592 Maputo Radio Mozambique Network in Portuguese 0600 GMT 22 Jul 92

[Text] The NOTICIAS newspaper reports a UN report has confirmed that a chemical agent similar to atropine was used against the Mozambique Armed Forces [FAM] soldiers who attacked Mozambique National Resistance's [Renamo] (Ngungue) base in January.

The report says the aforementioned chemical agent was contained in a shell fired against the FAM forces attacking (Ngungue), near the border with South Africa.

Atropine is an alkaloid extracted from Atropa belladona plants.

British experts confirmed earlier this week that chemical weapons had been used against the Mozambican Army at the time. Although they did not specify the type of chemical weapon used, they described it as a nerve agent.

SOUTH AFRICA

African Nations Invited To Visit Nuclear Unit

MB1607191592 Johannesburg Radio RSA in English 1600 GMT 16 Jul 92

[Text] South Africa has extended invitations to eight other African nations to visit its nuclear power installation with a view to increasing cooperation in the field of nuclear energy. The head of the South African Nuclear Energy Corporation, Dr. (Walter Stone), says that delegations from Kenya and Ghana had recently toured the corporation's installation and that a delegation from Egypt was due to arrive this month.

He said that South Africa's recent accession to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the international political arena had made it possible for the South African Nuclear Energy Corporation to receive delegations from Africa. Dr. (Stone) says that South Africa has also applied for membership of (?AFWA), an organization which channels development aid to Africa.

INTER-ASIAN AFFAIRS

ASEAN Urges North To Accept Nuclear Inspection

SK2407132992 Seoul YONHAP in English 0812 GMT 24 Jul 92

[Text] Manila, July 24 (OANA-YONHAP)—Partners to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Friday called on North Korea to accept inter-Korean nuclear inspection, saying it was necessary for stability in the Asian-Pacific region.

Japan, Australia and Canada, all full-dialogue partners to ASEAN, made the comments supporting South Korea's position on the inter-Korean nuclear issue at ASEAN's post-ministerial conference in this city.

All seven ASEAN partners registered support for active discussion of security issues at the post-ministerial conference.

The United States stressed a precondition, that such discussions stay at dialogue-level, however.

Washington was opposed to security cooperation that surpassed dialogue-level negotiations, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker told the conference.

The six-member ASEAN was joined by its seven partners in the conference that opened Friday. All ASEAN nations and their partners sent their foreign ministers to the meeting except for Japan, which sent a vice foreign minister.

Koji Kakizawa of Japan, Bareth Evans of Australia, and Barbara McDougall of Canada were among the first to take the podium for keynote speeches.

They emphasized that North Korea's early acceptance of inter-Korean nuclear inspection was a must in easing tension on the Korean peninsula and settling stability in the Asian-Pacific region.

They expressed support for regional dialogue on political and security issues, which sources say will be one of the priority items on the agenda at this year's ASEAN conference.

BURMA

Kachin Rebels Claim Government Using CW

BK2407015792 Bangkok THE NATION in English 24 Jul 92 p A4

[Text] Anti-Rangoon Kachin guerrillas have accused the Burmese Army of using chemical weapons against them in northwestern Kachin State near the Indian border. It would be the first use of chemical weapons against the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), the group said. The KIA, based in the rugged mountainous area, is one of a dozen armed ethnic groups which have been fighting in

border areas during the past four decades for greater autonomy from the Burmese government. There was not any hard evidence [to support] the KIA claims, however.

The accusations were based on testimony given by porters and Burmese Army troops arrested during clashes, according to Brang Seng, chairman of the Kachin Independence Organization which is the political wing of the KIA.

The Burmese Army began its offensive in Kachin State in April, about the same time it announced a unilateral ceasefire with Karen guerrillas in southern Karen State. The Karen said the retreat was a result of heavy casualities, however.

The Kachin accusations came after Burmese ground and air assaults on the Indian-Burmese border to recapture the villages of Pang Sau and Nam Yung which the KIA had captured from Burmese Army forces on June 5. Brang Seng said Burmese Army, operating out of a base in Danai township, had used air strikes and bombed the two villages. Under interrogation, captured Burmese porters and troops said they had been told to retreat 300 metres from the frontline as Burmese aircraft were going to drop "gas weapons".

"It is the first time they (Burmese Army) have used the gas weapon. We do not have any evidence as all those shells missed our positions, however," he said.

The KIA, in capturing the villages, had taken 27 Burmese prisoners of war, five of whom were released on June 21 and the rest on June 30, he said. The Kachin chairman said the prisoners had said they "were told in radio messages to move back 300 metres from the frontline as the Burmese planes were preparing to use a new kind of gas weapon for the first time."

The relevant Burmese word in the radio communications was Datnwake (gas) said another Kachin representative. Burmese ethnic dissidents have previously accused the Burmese Army of using chemical weapons, especially in the Shan State, but the groups could not provide evidence to prove the allegations.

Brang Seng said the Burmese Army, in another first against the KIA, employed paratroopers in its attack, dispatching 200 in three helicopters on June 7 to the battlegrounds. The heavy air raids forced the KIA troops to withdraw from Nam Yung and Pang Saw on June 15 and July 2 respectively, he said. The villages are located on strategic Ledo Road, which was built by the Allies during World War II as a main supply route from Assam in India to northern Burma.

He said 20 KIA troops were killed and 24 wounded in the battle. The KIA captured a large amount of weapons and ammunition including 95 assorted M16s, Germanmade G2, G3 and G4 machine-guns, about 20,000 rounds of ammunition, 42 tons of rice supplies and more than 1.4 million Kyat from the two villages. The KIA's capture of the villages and seizure of arms and supplies blocked the initial Burmese plan to move on to attack a KIA strategic outpost at Pinawang Zup on the Indian-Burmese frontier, he said.

Brang Seng said 18 Burmese troops under the command of Maj Than Soe fled from Pang Sau village into India and surrendered to the Assam Rifles, handing over their arms and a wireless set. All were later released, he said. More than 100 villagers also fled to India during the clashes, he added.

The Kachin chairman said he believed the Burmese attack on this western Kachin front with India was aimed at cutting off "all our access to the outside world," and disrupting the Indian-Kachin relations.

The KIA had earlier abandoned its 3rd Brigade headquarters on the Sino-Burmese border after heavy Burmese attacks.

JAPAN

Tokyo Electric May Import Uranium From PRC OW2107121292 Tokyo KYODO in English 1156 GMT

21 Jul 92
[Text] Tokyo, July 21 KYODO—Tokyo Electric Power Co. is studying a plan to import natural uranium from

China for use at its atomic power facilities, industry

sources said Tuesday.

If the plan goes through, the company will be the first Japanese electric utility to purchase natural uranium from China.

The sources said China has been looking for foreign importers as its demand for uranium resources for military use declined following the collapse of the eastwest cold war structure.

The sources said uranium resources in China are of good quality and inexpensive.

In addition, they said Japanese imports of uranium from China will help correct the trade imbalance between the two countries.

Tokyo Electric Power plans to import a small amount of uranium from China on a trial basis before deciding on a full-scale import program, the sources said.

Under a Nuclear Cooperation Treaty signed between Japan and China in 1986, the government-run Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corp. has been engaged in exploration for uranium resources in Liaoning Province, northeastern China.

Japanese electric power companies have already contracted to import about 220,000 short tons of uranium from Canada, Britain, and Australia on a long-term basis, securing supplies needed for their atomic power reactors by the end of this century.

The sources said the power utilities are looking for new sources of uranium supplies as an additional 700,000 tons of natural uranium will be needed by the year 2030 if they go ahead with their plans to build more generation facilities, however.

Officials of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry welcomed Tokyo Electric's plan as contributing to a stable supply of energy sources in the long run.

The officials pointed to a possibility of Japanese power companies importing natural uranium from Russia in the future.

Atomic power generation will rise to 72 million kilowatthours in fiscal 2010, accounting for 27 percent of the total electricity production, from 28.7 million kilowatthours or 17.4 percent of the total in fiscal 1988.

Accordingly, demand for uranium fuel will increase to 12,800 tons in 2005, nearly a two-fold increase over 1989.

Under existing international arrangements, all uranium imported by Japan will be transshipped either to the United States or France for enrichment for use at atomic reactors.

Government Role Sought in Fast Breeder Reactors OW2807024592 Tokyo KYODO in English 0155 GMT 28 Jul 92

[Text] Tokyo, July 28 KYODO—The Atomic Energy Commission on Tuesday recommended greater government involvement in development of fast breeder reactors to offset delays caused by a downturn in the private sector.

The commission made the recommendation in its first revision in five years of the government's long-term basic plan for the industry.

Under the revised plan, the government would play a stepped-up role in the development of a working version of a fast breeder reactor, rather than leaving it mainly to the private sector.

The end of the cold war era and the growth of private sector involvement in the development of nuclear power are behind the revision, officials said.

Japan's use of plutonium, also a component in nuclear weapons, has attracted international attention since the end of the cold war era, but the revised policy does not deviate from plans for placing the future emphasis on use of fast breeder reactors.

The new plan outlines steps for the next decade designed to take the nuclear power industry into the first half of the 21st century.

Fast breeder reactors use reprocessed plutonium as fuel, but produce more plutonium than they consume.

Japan already has one research reactor, named "Monju," in a nuclear power plant in Tsuruga, Fukui Prefecture.

But a commission subcommittee recommended the government take the lead from the private sector in the development of a working version of the Monju prototype.

The development of the working version is already behind schedule and because of the worsening economic situation, the plan shows the government is now prepared to step in and take the lead.

The committee said that to avoid misunderstandings internationally as well as domestically, it will make available its plans for reuse of plutonium, including the amount produced.

Since there will be a temporary oversupply of plutonium as a result of the dismantling of nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union, the long-term plan also provides for the development of fast breeders which do not produce excess plutonium.

NORTH KOREA

South Reportedly Lied About U.S. Withdrawal

SK2307050892 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0420 GMT 23 Jul 92

["South Side Is To Blame"-KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang July 23 (KCNA)—Through the seventh meeting of the North-South Joint Nuclear Control Committee held on July 21 the South side admitted that the "declaration on the absence of nuclear weapons" it had so far advertised was a lie and that it itself was to blame for the delayed discussion of matters for the implementation of the joint declaration on denuclearization, says a NODONG SINMUN analyst today.

He notes:

The South side avoided answering the question of our side as to which was true, the U.S. announcement on July 2 on the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from South Korea, or the South Korean chief executive's "declaration on the absence of nuclear weapons" in December last year. This tells that the South Korean chief executive's "declaration" was a lie and they have kept the U.S. nuclear weapons in hiding in contravention of the joint declaration on denuclearization.

Now that the "absence of nuclear weapons" advertised by it has turned out to be a lie and it has become clear who is to blame for the impasse over denuclearization, the South side must reflect on its insidious acts of going against the times and approach with sincerity the dialogue with the North for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

What is important is for the South side to discard the anachronistic idea of dependence on outside forces and

confrontation intended to get something by tailing behind foreign forces, bereft of the spirit of national independence.

The United States has announced the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from South Korea and, if it is true, the South Korean authorities must not turn their backs on their total inspection any longer but respond to the North's fair and aboveboard proposal regarding rules of inspection without delay.

Whether the question of denuclearization of the Korean peninsula is solved or not entirely depends on the attitude of the South side.

N-S Nuclear Control Committee Meets

SK2107152992 Pyongyang KCNA in English 1510 GMT 21 Jul 92

[Text] Panmunjom July 21 (KCNA)—The seventh meeting of the North-South Joint Nuclear Control Committee was held at the Tongil House in the North side's portion of Panmunjom today.

The chairman of the North side gave a news briefing after the meeting.

According to him, the North side stated at the meeting that the second irregular inspection of the nuclear facilities and materials of the North was carried out successfully by the International Atomic Energy Agency from July 7 to 20, through which it was reaffirmed that the North was using nuclear energy only for peaceful purposes.

The North side said, since the United States recently declared that it has withdrawn the nuclear weapons" from South Korea, the South side must allow its verification without hesitation and urgently take a practical measure to fully convince the public that no U.S. nuclear weapon remain in South korea.

Recalling that the United States issued a statement as late as July 2 that it had withdrawn its nuclear weapons from South korea, too, though the South side published "a declaration on the absense of nuclear weapons" in December last year, the North side asked whose words were true and how the South side which was neither the owner of the nuclear weapons nor the party directly concerned with them could declare that there were no U.S. nuclear weapon in South Korea already seven months ago. It urged the South side to clearly explain its background and answer the question as to how many nuclear weapons were withdrawn from South Korea and when.

To this the South side evaded an answer and when the North side pressed it hard with the question, it made an absurd excuse, mumbling that it was only following the U.S. policy of "neither confirming nor denying the presence of nuclear weapons."

Concluding the meeting, the North side said that, if the South side truly had the intention to implement the joint declaration on the denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula, it should come out to the next meeting after deeply studying the North side's just and reasonable draft of the agreement on its mplementation and the draft regulations of inspection.

It was agreed to hold the eighth meeting of the North-South Joint Nuclear Control Committee on August 31.

SOUTH KOREA

North Deputy Premier Kim Tal-hyon Visits

Meets National Security Head

SK2507004892 Seoul YONHAP in English 0022 GMT 25 Jul 92

[Text] Seoul, July 25 (YONHAP)—Visiting North Korean Deputy Premier Kim Tal-hyon met with Yi Sang-yon, head of the Agency for National Security Planning late Friday, informed sources said Saturday.

Yi had dinner with Kim's entourage at a Seoul Hotel and met separately with Kim later, the sources said.

Yi explained Seoul's position that resolution of the nuclear issue would open the way for inter-Korean economic cooperation and called for Pyongyang's sincere efforts, they said.

Kim was to return home Saturday after a week-long tour of South Korea.

Meets With No Tae-u

SK2407102292 Seoul YONHAP in English 0951 GMT 24 Jul 92

[Excerpts] Seoul, July 24 (YONHAP)—President No Tae-u's talks with visiting North Korean Vice Premier Kim Tal-hyon lasted 20 more minutes than planned 30 minutes until 12:20 P.M., which was immediately followed by Chongwadae luncheon through 1:30 P.M. [passage omitted]

Throughout the meeting, President No repeatedly emphasized the importance of non-economic environment for inter-Korean economic cooperation, calling for early resolution of the nuclear issue and auxiliary agreements.

In response, Kim Tal-hyon said if and when the two sides agree on and undertake several pilot economic projects, it would be helpful to the progress of dialogue and also to the development of national economy. [passage omitted]

'Secret Talk' Held

SK2407011692 Seoul HANGUK ILBO in Korean 24 Jul 92 p 1

[Excerpt] It was learned on 23 July that a high-level figure [choegowikup insa] of our government secretly met with Kim Tal-hyon, vice premier of the North Korean Administration Council who is now visiting Seoul, on the night of 19 July and exchanged a broad range of views on overall North-South issues.

At the talks, the two figures discussed the contents of messages to be exchanged between top figures of the North and South and the content of our side's call for the North side's resolute political decision to resolve the nuclear issue—the greatest stumbling block in North-South exchanges.

This secret talk, held prior to Vice Premier Kim's meeting with President No Tae-u, is noteworthy because it was held at a time when an opinion was raised stressing that political decisions between North-South top figures are inevitable in a bid to provide a breakthrough in resolving at an early date the presently deadlocked issue of North Korea's nuclear development and in resolving North-South exchanges and cooperation including economic cooperation. [passage omitted]

Impact of Chemical Arms Ban Accord Reviewed

SK2707002992 Seoul YONHAP in English 0002 GMT 27 Jul 92

[Text] Seoul, July 27 (OANA-YONHAP)—South Korea's 50 billion U.S. dollar chemical market and billion dollars more of related exports are at stake from a global chemical weapons ban accord due at the end of this year.

South Korea told the Conference on Disarmament meeting in Geneva last week, the first in which countries could announce their positions, that it would accept the accord draft as it is with scores of other nations.

The centerpiece of the accord is a pledge by all owner countries of chemical weapons to destroy them within 10 years while non-owners promise not to develop them.

Key parts for countries like South Korea, although less played up at this point, are strict regulations on sales and use of some 20 chemicals used in the weapons-making and also applied commercially in auto and electronics manufacturing process, fabric dyes and pesticides.

The draft on the chemical weapons ban treaty was prepared in June, and its wide acceptance at last week's meeting virtually guarantees its approval by the U.N. General Assembly.

The treaty will be opened for signing from December and it will take affect two years later on condition that at least 65 nations sign it.

South Korea's main concern is with regulations on large-quantity transfer of chemicals, requiring detailed sales and use report from both exporting and importing countries.

According to the draft agreement, nations suspected of unreported transfer activities are subject to inspection.

A Foreign Ministry initial report, compiled after meetings with related ministries and chemical industrial leaders, points out some major negative impacts.

The reporting regime may force open industrial research secrets including facilities and their operation records. This may lead to industrial monopoly by advanced nations.

It will limit and delay availability of the needed chemical products although they are intended solely for commercial use, hurting South Korea's export activities.

The current process is already time-consuming since the United States, Japan and Germany, major sellers to South Korea, require prior permit before export.

A more technical problem is South Korea's low productivity rate when using same amount of materials as other countries.

Advanced nations can turn 90 percent of chemical raw materials into product form while the rate is about 80 percent for South Korea. Having to account for the 10 percent gap every time will be no easy task, according to the report.

Other countries have long been preparing for the treaty, holding regular talks for the past few years between the government and industry leaders and inviting businessmen to attend negotiations meetings on the treaty.

"We have just begun assessing possible impact of the treaty on South Korea, and we are not quite ready to say anything or do anything definite," Cho kyu-hyong, director of Security Policy Department at the Foreign Ministry, says.

First meeting of such kind was held late last year, and the second just last month. They were mostly for exchange of information rather than seeking countermeasures.

A third, more in-depth meeting is scheduled sometime next month before the treaty draft is approved by the U.N. General Assembly.

"There are still debates on pros and cons of joining the treaty. The principle of preventing weapons proliferation is respectable, but from economic perspective, the principle is ambiguous," Cho says.

INDIA

Support to Pact Against Chemical Arms Noted
92WP0261 Madras THE HINDU in English 6 Jun 92
p. 9

[Article by K.K. Katyal]

[Text] New Delhi, June 5—Austria resents the conduct of Pakistan's ambassador in Geneva in arrogating to himself the role of determining the location of the proposed Chemical Weapons Authority. Austria is keen on having its headquarters in Vienna, while rival claims have been pressed for Geneva and the Hague. The details of this diplomatic problem became known today as Austria formally approached India for support to Vienna's claim.

Ostensibly, the Pakistani envoy is acting as the friend of the chairman of the 34-nation Disarmament Commission—which is to select the venue. It is a recognised practice in international dealings, that the friend of the chairman of the organisation concerned informally sounds its members in cases of sharp disagreement and advises the minority to withdraw its claim in the interest of unanimity. But, Austrians suspect that the Pakistani ambassador is acting without proper authorisation from the chairman. They fear that this procedure may work to their disadvantage.

The acting foreign secretary of Austria, Mr. M. Gleissner, who is here now to canvass support for Vienna, met the minister of state for External Affairs, Mr. Eduardo Faleiro, to hand over to him a letter from his foreign minister, addressed to the prime minister, Mr. P.V. Narasimha Rao. Mr. Gleissner also had talks with senior officials of the Ministry, to press the claim for Vienna. It was during these discussions that a reference was made to the Pakistani envoy's role.

Austria's record: Mr. Gleissner argued strongly in favour of Vienna. The location there of the Chemical Weapons Authority, according to him, would be in keeping with the philosophy of his country's foreign policy. He referred to Austria's impeccable record in providing venues for the nuclear non-proliferation authority and disarmament agencies and conferences. Austria, it was pointed out, had the experience and the infrastructural facilities of the type that would be needed for the proposed Authority.

The two other claimants, Switzerland and the Netherlands, too, have approached India, with equally pressing pleas for support to their respective cases. India has yet to make up its mind. The final decision, to be influenced by several factors, including technical facilities, will be taken at the political level. The convention on the chemical weapons is due to be signed in Geneva in August and the stage of locating the Authority will be reached only then.

India has committed support to the convention against chemical weapons and has taken a leading role in advocating total prohibition of their production and development. In the sub-continent, it offered a bilateral declaration to Pakistan on the subject, without waiting for the convention to become a legal requirement.

U.S. Reaction to Nonproliferation Stand Eyed

92WP0260A Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 3 Jun 92 pp 1, 16

[Article by Gautam Adhikari]

[Text] Washington, June 2—There appears to be a proliferation of moves in the United States, particularly in the U.S. Congress and the media, against India's case on the issue of nuclear non-proliferation. India will have to weigh its position carefully before it responds.

Today, THE WASHINGTON POST carried a lead editorial on "India's nuclear semantics." On April 28, THE NEW YORK TIMES had an editorial which was the first such attack on India's position in recent weeks. Now there are moves afoot in Congress against India.

THE NEW YORK TIMES editorial had said: "Islamabad seems willing to halt bomb-making. Now it's up to India, which long ago abandoned the pacifism of Mohandas Gandhi." Today's WASHINGTON POST accuses India of obfuscating the issue by using clever semantics.

India in 1974 exploded "a device (not a bomb)" and that its second test of the Agni missile was a "nuclear capable technology demonstrator (not a missile)," says THE POST in a sarcastic vein. "If Indian scientists are as skilled as Indian semanticists—and there is reason to think they are—then India is just a screwdriver's turn and an honest word away from being a full-fledged and acknowledged nuclear power," the paper says.

The U.S. administration has generally been quieter. The state department spokesperson expressed U.S. "regret" the day after the test firing of Agni last week. Senior officials regularly express concern and urge India, behind the scenes, to move positively on non-proliferation. But they cannot do much to prevent moves against India in the U.S. Congress that may be on the anvil.

Mr Dan Burton, Republican Congressman from Indiana, has already introduced a bill urging the President to cut off development assistance to India because of its alleged human rights failings and draconian preventive detention laws. India, in fact, can probably do without that aid—around \$20 million a year—but tougher measures may come up soon in congressional legislation.

A Capital Hill source, who declined to be named, said that Mr Robert Lagomarsino, Republican from California, is soon likely to introduce a bill, or an amendment to an existing bill, demanding action against India for its refusai to observe the norms of non-proliferation. Mr Lagomarsine is a consequent with set India.

Mr Stephen Solarz India, puttar of support in the Congress is a bit in the intensive these days, after his name was promountly, involved in the recent cheque bouncing standard although his fectoral district in Brooklyn, New Years of Serna restrawn he is expected to win another term itos November But some important cheque bouncers in comaron has been defeated or are facing likely delical. For Imha Mr Sidarz's presence on the Hill as important at timos like these. He has often rallied in male appropries to India.

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process of defence co-operation with India, one step in which was the joint U.S.-India naval exercise held last week.

There are also contrary influences, less favourably inclined towards India. The latter sections run from those who call for what can be described as a policy of "benign but watchful neglect" of India and Pakistan, to those who would like the U.S. to come down hard on India and return to a better relationship with Pakistan, an older and more trustworthy ally of the U.S. in the region

The push and pull between these sections of opinion continue within the administration. But India would soon need to take note of the gathering clouds in the houses of Congress and the media.

Interestingly, both the NEW YORK TIMES and THE WASHINGTON POST feel that the U.S. could and should apply steady economic pressure to make India comply with the norms of non-proliferation.

Wrote THE NEW YORK TIMES on April 28: "The world around India has changed. Once leader of the non-aligned movement, India no longer has anything to be non-aligned against. Instead, it has a special interest in cultivating political and economic relationships with the rest of the world. That's a source of potential leverage for nations with an interest in a nuclear-free India. The U.S. and its allies can condition new ties on India's acceptance of international inspection.

WASHINGTON POST, in its editorial today, also cites India's need of western help. "India, losing its old Soviet connection and abandoning a statists economy at the same time, has a growing need for full contacts with the United States and the world economy," says the newspaper. "It has security needs too and is now open to working with Washington on some of them—though not yet on regional nuclear restraint. That is where the priority lies."

U.S. Position on Nuclear Materials Queried

BK2207022292 Delhi THE HINDUSTAN TIMES in English 16 Jul 92 p 10

[Editorial: "The Logic of the Haves"]

[Text] President George Bush's announcement on July 13 that the United States will not produce plutonium and highly enriched uranium for nuclear explosive purposes will not hold water in its claim to be an effective means to bolster non-proliferation efforts. Mr Bush has made the suo motu statement from his vacation home in Kennebunkport to achieve a purpose. Since the U.S. President attaches importance to his government's policy of sparing no efforts to prevent nuclear non-proliferation, one must receive answers to some basic questions before taking his proposition seriously. The first question that can be asked before extending to him congratulations for the U.S. decision not to produce any

more plutonium and enriched uranium is to tell the world how much of these dangerous materials America possesses and to what extent the stockpile can damage (if not destroy) the world. A former U.S. Secretary of Defence, Mr Robert S. McNamara, joined two other experts to write in 1991 that the world stockpile of nuclear weapons at present consists of some 52,000 nuclear warheads. According to them, 97 percent of these were in the hands of the U.S. and the Soviet Union (CIS). Last month, Mr Bush and Russian President Boris Yeltsin announced their decision to reduce their nuclear arsenals to 3500 each in less then 13 years. This does sound revolutionary, but what needs explaining is that if 50,000 nuclear warheads are to be reduced to about 7,000 (as per the Bush-Yeltsin decision), what happens to the plutonium and enriched uranium contained in the roughly 21,000 nuclear warheads that will still remain in the possession of the U.S. for a period extending up to 13 years? Secondly, have the U.S. or any of the other four declared nuclear powers ever divulged the amount of plutonium and enriched uranium in their posssession which had still not been used to make nuclear weapons?

Mr Bush has, however, chosen to threaten the use of "the full range of political, security, intelligence and other tools at our disposal" to create an "airtight seal against proliferation." By constantly harping on the theme of a world where "regional tensions may erupt into war" in which nuclear weapons could be used with devastating consequences. Washington would almost seem to be hoping for such conflicts to emerge so that it can employ its "security" tool (a euphemism for military action) to legitimise its medicine for the world's ills. If Mr Bush is sincere about non-proliferation, and there is no doubt about his intentions, his objectives would be promoted more by dialogues and discussions, and not by unilateral declarations and veiled threats.

U.S. Pressure Will Not Stall Missile Plans

92WP0259 Calcutta THE TELEGRAPH in English 4 Jun 92 p 5

[Text] New Delhi, June 3—India remains unperturbed by the United States' unfavourable response on the test-launch of Agni and intends to go ahead with its missile and rocket technology programmes.

The United States, which has threatened sanctions if India secures the cryogenic rocket technology from Russia and has been discouraging the development of indigenous missile technology, had described the recent Agni launch as "regrettable." Significantly, Pakistan too has reacted strongly to the Agni launch and a spokesman said in Islamabad today that it amounted to being a "threat" to neighbouring countries. India, however, maintains that the test launch was merely a "technology demonstrator."

The U.S. response was predictable in the light of its overall policy on forcing disarmament particularly in the developing world but South Block feels India cannot abandon its "scientific" pursuits because of pressure.

India has also been holding out against U.S.-led lobbying that New Delhi comply with the nuclear non-proliferation regime

There is also a realisation among policy planners that India cannot doggedly continue saying no to the NPT [Nonproliferation Treaty], however, and, as more and more countries agree to sign it, New Delhi will have to explain its opposition more convincingly

After China's assent to the NPT and the two Koreas' decision to create a nuclear free zone in the Korean peninsula, pressure has been mounting on India to agree to the NPT and a nuclear-free south Asia

India has, in fact, agreed to "continue dialogue" with the U.S. on a nuclear-free south Asia but is still not amenable to the Pakistan-sponsored proposal for a five-power conference on a nuclear-free zone on the plea that the approach to nuclear disarmament should be global rather than regional.

The decision to continue dialogue is, in fact, part of the strategy to resist pressure as long as India can, while at the same time not annoying the U.S. beyond a point India's stand on the nuclear and defence-related issue will, after all, have to be moderated by the needs of the economy which, at the moment is heavily reliant on aid from western institutions like the World Bank and 'MF [International Monetary Fund]

U.S. Ban Could Delay Some Satellite Launches

92WP0269 Madras THE HINDU in English 18 Jun 92 p 9

[Text] Bangalore, June 17—The U.S. administration's decision to tighten controls on export of materials used in launch vehicles might possibly retard some of the later launches of the Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle [PSLV] programme. It is, however, unlikely to stop the first launch of the PSLV which is scheduled to take place before March 1993.

While earlier the U.S. ban targetted the Indian Space Research Organisation [ISRO] alone, the current move is intended to stop all materials and components used in launch vehicles from reaching the country in any way. It also covers re-exports of American goods from other countries.

Indications are that the ban would prevent export from the United States of two important materials used in rocket motors: Kevlar fibre and carbon phenolic cloth. India has, however, strong programmes for the indigenous manufacture of both Kevlar and carbon phenolic cloth.

Bullet-proof clothing: Kevlar fibre can be used and in India is being used for making bullet-proof clothing as well. Carbon fibres are being imported for the manufacture of strong light-weight tennis racquets (which have a good export market) Carbon phenolic cloth, whose export is specifically prohibited under the Missile Technology Control Regime [MTCR], is used as an ablative to protect rocket nozzles from the heat of the flame. The phenolic resin has already been indigenised. Rather than weave carbon fibres into a cloth, ISRO has been trying to carbonise woven rayon. The carbonised cloth is then impregnated with phenolic resin.

Although this method has been shown to be feasible, there have been problems in commercial production where large lengths of cloth have to be carbonised evenly. The ISRO is working hand-in-hand with a small-scale unit, Aerospace Materials of Pollachi (in Tamil Nadu), for the commercial production of carbon phenolic cloth. The problem can be solved quickly if adequate emphasis and support is given, both of which were reportedly insufficient as long as carbon phenolic cloth could be imported.

Indigenous effort: The ISRO has already successfully indigenised the process for silica phenolic cloth (which too is used as an ablative) and has transferred the technology to two companies. It is also known to be working on indigenising silica phenolic inserts used in the PSLV's Vikas liquid engine which the French have been refusing to supply for some time after American pressure that it violated the Missile Technology Control Regime.

The National Aeronautics Laboratory has come up with a laboratory-scale process for the production of a Kevlar-like fibre which it calls Nalar. The process is being transferred to DCM Shriram for commercialisation, but again some problems are said to have cropped up in scaling up. Kevlar is wound round to create light and strong solid motor cases of launch vehicle upper stages.

There are sources outside the U.S. for both Kevlar equivalents and for carbon cloth. Difficulties in securing imports could affect only subsequent PSLV launches and of the GSLV (Geo-stationery Satellite Launch Vehicle) which is derived from the PSLV. There is, therefore, some breathing space for the indigenous efforts to bear fruit, if properly encouraged.

Rao Discusses NPT with Japanese Industrialists

92.4S1226A Madras THE HINDU in English 24 Jun 92 p 9

[Article by K.K. Katyal]

[Excerpt] Tokyo, 23 June—The Prime Minister, Mr. P.V. Narasimha Rao, today assured Japanese businessmen that they would find the Government receptive and open to their ideas for improving the investment and trade climate in India. At the same time, he wanted them to keep in mind India's constraints and look at it from a long-term perspective.

Addressing a galaxy of Japanese industrialists, he said many of their complaints regarding India had been dealt with. He referred to the decisions to permit majority equity holding in all but a few strategic sectors, liberalise capital imports, abolish the phased manufacturing programme, make easy the repatriation of dividends, make the rupee convertible and move towards complete convertibility at least on the trade account. [passage omitted]

Speech to Foreign Affairs Group

92AS1226C Madras THE HINDU in English 24 Jun 92 p 6

[Article by K.K. Katyal]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted]

No Justification For N-Weapons

On nuclear proliferation, an issue which has always been one of our central concerns, we see an opportunity which we hope the world will not miss, just because of the narrow interests of a few nuclear weapon states. If there was ever any justification for nuclear weapons, there is none now. This hardly needs any elaboration. We, in India, have always supported the goal of a world free of ruclear weapons. This would involve a binding commitment by the present nuclear weapon states to eliminate all their nuclear weapons, matching commitments by the threshold states not to cross the threshold, and verification of these commitments with clear timeframes for their implementation. As steps towards this goal, we envisage a convention on the non-use of these unusable weapons, a verifiable freeze on the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes, suspension of all nuclear weapons tests, and negotiations on general and complete disarmament. India, like Japan, is one of the few States which chose consciously not to manufacture nuclear weapons even though it could have. Countries like ours should speak with one voice on these issues as the conscience of humanity. [passage omitted]

Talks With Miyazawa

92AS1226D Madras THE HINDU in English 24 Jun 92 p.1

[Article by K.K. Katyal]

[Excerpts] Tokyo, 23 June—A broad convergence emerged out of today's talks between the Prime Minister of India and Japan, Mr. P.V. Narasimha Rao and Mr. Kiichi Miyazawa, with the two leaders deciding to stay in touch on international matters. This was how an official spokesman summed up the 90-minute "friendly and informal" talks. What it meant in relation to specific issues was not clear. It, perhaps, implied that apart from the issues of agreement, there was a clear disinclination to press divergence on the subjects on which the perceptions differed.

They certainly did not press their known different positions on issues connected with nuclear non-proliferation and, after Mr. Rao had given a longish exposition of India's stand, decided on a course of bilateral consultations. Whether they would follow the pattern of the Indo-U.S. dialogue remained a matter of speculation.

Mr. Miyazawa wanted to know India's views on nonproliferation in the post-Cold War context after they expressed shared concern over the possibility of the spread of nuclear weapons in the wake of the break-up of the Soviet Union. It was then that Mr. Rao explained his Government's view.

India, said Mr. Rao, was ready to explore with Japan elements of a new international consensus on nuclear non-proliferation, which takes into account the global dimension of the problem and incorporates arrangements, comprehensive in scope and non-discriminatory in character. As the only country that had suffered the horrors of a nuclear strike, Japan could bring immense moral authority to bear on the efforts for nuclear disarmament, he said.

The visit was somewhat overshadowed by other events here—like the conference on reconstruction and rehabilitation of Cambodia and the domestic controversies, both political and economic. India, however, had the satisfaction that Japan did not tend to link the aid to issues such as the cut in defence expenditure or New Delhi's accession to the non-proliferation treaty. [passage omitted]

Democratising U.N.

As regards the U.N., the two leaders agreed to work together for the objective of democratising and reforming its structure and decision-making processes.

On nuclear weapons, the Prime Minister, while arguing India's case against the NPT [Nonproliferation Treaty] recalled that Japan had pointed to its discriminatory character, while acceding to it in the 70s.

The treaty, he said, was due for review after three years, the preparatory work for which would start in 1993 and now was the time to work for an international consensus, taking into account the changes in the global environment. The danger, in his opinion, did not arise from one or two recalcitrant states but the frightening possibility of the spread of readymade nuclear weapons. He commended the Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan presented to the U.N.

The Prime Minister quoted from Japan's reservations at the time of its signing the NPT—that it "permits only the nuclear weapon states to possess nuclear weapons and allows them special status. Nuclear weapon states must rectify this discrimination in the future by totally abolishing their weapons."

Meeting With Newsmen

92AS1226E Madras THE HINDU in English 25 Jun 92 p 1

[Article by K.K. Katyal]

[Excerpts] Tokyo, 24 June—Removing the confusion caused by differing versions of his talks here yesterday.

the Prime Minister, Mr. P.V. Narasimha Rao, categorically stated there was no demand or pressure on India by Japan to sign the nuclear non-proliferation treaty [NPT]. [passage omitted]

Time for 'NPT Review'

K.V. Narain reports:

Mr. Rao told presspersons that India was against the presence of any nuclear weapon or weapons of mass destruction anywhere but the fact remained they were available in impressive quantities in some countries. The solution was that those states which had nuclear weapons should agree to dismantle all of them and there should be a ban on testing of such weapons and on production of any material used to make the weapons.

Mr. Rao pointed out that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was discriminatory and did not aim at total destruction. Some states insisted on keeping such weapons. India, he noted, had the same views as Japan, which has signed the NPT. There were some imperfections in the NPT and a beginning should be made to correct them to make the treaty absolutely safe.

Mr. Rao said if there was a nuclear holocaust, all would be affected. When a weapon of mass destruction was unleashed, none would be spared. So the only logical solution to the complex problem was that the states which were in possession of weapons of mass destruction should agree to dismantle them on specific lines and the threshold States should give an undertaking not to cross the threshold. There should be a ban on testing and manufacture of fissionable material. [passage omitted]

IRAN

Velayati Gives 'Positive' View of Nuclear Treaty

LD2607163892 Tehran IRIB Television First Program Network in Persian 1430 GMT 26 Jul 92

[Text] A one-day seminar on the national effects of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty was convened today in the premises of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with the participation of the foreign minister and a number of experts and military officials.

At the seminar, Mr. Velayati viewed the present and future system governing international relations. He said Considering that we are ourselves among the main victims of the deployment of chemical weapons and that even before the Halabjah tragedy we were the standard-bearers for peace and the total banning of these kinds of weapons in the world, we still view the nuclear non-proliferation treaty in a positive manner, taking into account the lofty interests of our system [of the Islamic Republic]. We hope that the remaining issues in the

treaty will be solved with special regard for the difficulties and concerns of countries and that the draft of the treaty will be accepted.

IAEA Inspection Team Receives More Cooperation LD2507123592 Tehran IRNA in English 1649 GMT 24 Jul 92

[Text] Vienna, July 24, IRNA—The Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections teams to Iraq received "better cooperation" than other U.N. teams, according to a spokesman of the agency. The IAEA spokesman was referring to the standoff at the Baghdad Agriculture Ministry in which U.N. weapons inspectors were denied access to the ministry building.

IAEA teams have been investigating Iraq's nuclear capabilities since May last year under the terms of the U.N. Security Resolution 687. Thirteen agency missions have visited the country so far and the last team returned to Vienna Tuesday after a week's activities. The agency spokesman said that "we have had a period of very good cooperation from the Iraqis until relatively recently". He noted "a sense of bitterness" on the Iraqi side. "We sensed frustration that after more than a year of cooperating with our inspectors in the nuclear side they are not seeing any returns—no easing of the sanctions".

If the IAEA is to be believed the Iraqi authorities agreed to the demolition of "many million dollars worth" of buildings and installations and have "answered many thousands" of agency inspectors' questions. Not since the sixth mission in September last year did the agency encounter difficulties with the Iraqi authorities. The spokesman said that further inspection missions are planned. "We have a pretty good picture of Baghdad's nuclear program. We do hope that we can move on from the investigative phase soon to long-term monitoring".

The IAEA envisages long-term monitoring of Baghdad's peaceful nuclear program and expects to send an agency mission to Iraq every two months. Iraq is not allowed to have a reactor and the agency is committed to tracking weapons-related nuclear activities. But there is no ban on Iraq possessing nuclear materials for agricultural, medical and industrial purposes, which the agency has to monitor, the IAEA spokesman added.

Monafeqin Hides Chemical Arms From UN Teams

LD2107161392 Tehran IRIB Television First Program Network in Persian 1430 GMT 21 Jul 92

[Text] According to a Central News Unit report, the Monafeqin [Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization] minigroup's extensive and all-embracing cooperation with the Iraqi regime has led to the latter recently adopting a new ploy to deceive world public opinion by making wide-scale use of the mercernery Monafeqin minigroup. The Monafeqin minigroup, which collaborates extensively with the Iraqi regime regime in crushing the

Muslims in southern and northern Iraq, is now being used for a new mission. The report states that the Iraqi regime is handing over its destructive and chemical weapons to the Monafeqin when UN inspector teams are making their inspection tours, and that the mercenary elements of the minigroup load the consignments onto trucks, which they drive around the country so as to avoid the UN inspection teams.

IRAQ

Demonstrations Against UN Inspectors Reported NC2107121592 Paris AFP in English 1130 GMT 21 Jul 92

[Report by Farouk Choukri]

[Text] Baghdad, July 21 (AFP)—Thousands of demonstrators burned effigies of President George Bush here Tuesday and told U.N. weapons inspectors to go home as the United Nations examined ways of responding to Iraq's refusal to allow a search of its Agriculture Ministry.

The United States, Britain and France warned Iraq against continuing to reject the terms of the ceasefire that ended the Gulf war, saying further military action was not ruled out. The ambassadors of the three nations commented after a briefing before the Security Council late Monday by Rolf Ekeus, the Swedish head of the U.N. operation to disarm Iraq who visited Baghdad last week in a failed bid to end the standoff.

There was no immediate official reaction from Baghdad to the warnings but the streets outside the ministry rang with angry protests. For the third consecutive day, demonstrators burned effigies of Bush, set U.S. flags on fire and carried banners reading: "We reject you. Go home." Thousands of residents of Saddam-City, a working-class district north of here, Arab students, lawyers and Iraqis from several provinces took part in the three-hour protest, shouting anti-U.N. and anti-U.S. slogans.

Iraqi security forces guarded the U.N. experts to prevent any outbreak of violence, while the inspectors, camped in air-conditioned vehicles nearby, filmed the demonstrators.

U.N. ceasefire resolutions call for the dismantling of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and authorise U.N. weapons experts to carry out searches in Iraqi installations for weapons secrets and armaments.

A team of chemical experts have maintained a roundthe-clock vigil outside the Iraqi Agriculture Ministry here in shifts since July 5, after the authorities prevented them from searching the building. The U.N. suspects the ministry of holding data on Iraq's ballistic weapons programme. Iraq has denied this and says a search would violate its sovereignty.

Iraq also proposed an inspection by an impartial country or neutral members of the Security Council, saying that team leaders sent to date were U.S. agents or armed forces officers. The United Nations rejected the compromise.

The government's AL-JUMHURIYAH newspaper pursued a virulent campaign against the U.N. team Tuesday under a banner headline reading: "The Wrath of the Demonstrators Has Triggered Panic Among the Vermin," a reference to the inspectors. AL-THAWRAH newspaper of the ruling Ba'th Party issued a similar attack against the inspectors. But it praised the cooperation between Iraqi authorities and another chemical mission led by the American Richard Hooper. Hooper's team left Iraq on Tuesday after destroying four buildings at the al-Tarmiyah and Sharqat sites north of Baghdad—the last nuclear plants to be leveled.

Kurds Claim Ministry Has Chemical Arms Papers

NC2207193092 Paris AFP in English 1850 GMT 22 Jul 92

[Text] Ankara, July 22 (AFP)—The Kurd leader in Iraq, Jalal Talabani, said Wednesday there were vital documents on Iraq's nuclear and chemical weapons in the Agriculture Ministry in Baghdad.

Talabani said the "very important documents" were hidden in the Ministry's basement. "We know from our sources there (in Baghdad) that documents concerning the site of nuclear weapons, even biological weapons, in Iraq are hidden in the Agriculture Ministry," he said without going into further detail.

Talabani said the United Nations inspectors, who called off their 17-day vigil outside the ministry on Wednesday fearing for their safety, "could not have been aware of the tunnels and secret underground passages under the building," through which he said "the documents could have been moved elsewhere."

ISRAEL

Europe Restricts Arms Exports to Israel

TA2607091092 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 26 Jul 92 pp A1, A8

[Report by defense correspondent Aluf Ben]

[Excerpt] Restrictions imposed by West European countries on permits for defense exports to Israel have grown stricter since the Gulf war. According to defense establishmen: and defense industries officials as well as private arms dealers, Israel is included on a list of problematic countries to which arms sales are avoided. Although no embargo has been formally declared, procedures

governing the issuance of export permits practically preclude the purchase of West European military equipment and material.

Although most of the IDF's [Israel Defense Forces] weapons are either locally- or U.S.-manufactured, it also uses European equipment, such as antiaircraft artillery and naval guns. To operate these systems, some of which are outdated, the defense establishment needs West European spare parts and ammunition.

To purchase relatively simple weapons items and ammunition, Defense Ministry procurement officials often require Israeli and foreign middlemen, who charge commissions for the procurement deals.

Countries that have restricted exports to Israel over the past year include Germany, Britain, Italy, Switzerland, and the Netherlands. The restrictions are legally valid. Some of the countries had in the past imposed an embargo on Israel, which has never been officially lifted; in others, such as Germany, arms exports to "tense regions" are prohibited.

France, which does not usually encumber its weapons sales, has for years applied stalling tactics in granting permits for defense exports to Israel, although Israeli elements say the French policy has not grown stricter in the past year.

Some of the countries obstructing arms exports to Israel have for many years maintained good ties with the defense establishment and purchased large quantities of Israeli weapons and ammunition. Moreover, European defense industries, whose financial status has suffered as a result of the crisis in international weapon markets, are interested in selling to Israel. Yet these elements have no influence on the export restrictions, which depend on political decisions.

Defense establishment elements cite two main reasons for the European stand:

- —A desire to punish Israel for the stands promoted by the Shamir government, which determined that the EC has no place in the peace process and which opposed the inclusion of the EC in the arms control team in the framework of the multilateral talks.
- —European countries' desire to show the absence of bias toward Israel to the detriment of Arab countries, to which exports had been limited in the wake of the Gulf war and the revelations concerning the involvement of European countries in Iraq's development of weapons of mass destruction.

Defense establishment elements further assert that objections by European countries, led by France, prevented Israel from joining the MTCR [Missile Technology Control Regime], which aims to limit long-range missile proliferation and the development and manufacture of missile technologies.

The MTCR was joined largely by EC countries which, according to the same elements, barred Israel's inclusion

with the tacit consent of the United States, which wanted to hinder the existence of an independent Israeli missile industry. [passage omitted]

PAKISTAN

Chemical Arms Talks With India Scheduled in Aug

BK2207121492 Islamabad Radio Pakistan Network in English 1100 GMT 22 Jul 92

[Text] The sixth round of Pakistan-India foreign secretaries-level talks are likely to focus on bilateral

declarations on prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons. The two-day talks are to begin in New Delhi on the 17th of next month. The talks will also cover the entire range of bilateral relations, with special focus on Kashmir problem, Siachen issue, Wullar Barrage, Sir Creek, and matters pertaining to nuclear nonproliferation and confidence-building measures. A Foreign Office spokesman said in Islamabad today that the foreign secretaries are also expected to finalize the draft code of conduct on treatment of accredited diplomatic persons.

Western Concerns for CIS Nuclear Power Safety

LD2407084092 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 22 Jul 92 p 3

[Article by Mikhail Pogorelyy: "West Concerned About Our Nuclear Reactor Safety"]

[Text] The problem of ensuring world safety standards for Soviet-made nuclear reactors was discussed, as is well known, at the "G-7" leaders' Munich summit. In the two weeks since then the subject has been further developed—not least within the framework of the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] and the OECD. Hearings on the subject were even held the other day in the U.S. Congress.

The fact is that, by Western standards, the Soviet-made RBMK [high-power pressure-tube reactor] reactors cannot be considered safe because they are not equipped with massive steel and concrete structures to contain radiation in the event of an accident. In this case there is no question about the design shortcomings of this reactor—flaws which have been energetically debated and sharply criticized in the Western press.

According to assessments by IAEA experts, the second main type of reactor—the different versions of VVER [water-cooled water-moderated reactor] reactor—has no emergency cooling system or backup coolant inlets and outlets, and the reactor is not lined with stainless steel. In the specialists' opinion, the more successful versions—the VVER-1000 and the VVER-440/213 (31 units in all)—could be brought up to the necessary safety standard. According to Ivan Selin, chairman of the U.S. committee for nuclear safety, the other 10 VVER 440/230 and all 15 RBMK reactors are not suitable for further use.

Currently, according to IAEA figures, there are a total of 57 Soviet-made reactors "in operation" in the former USSR republics and the states of East Europe, while 29 are still under construction (including one each in Cuba and India). RBMK's are located only in our country—Smolensk, Kursk, Sosnovyy Bor, Chernobyl, and Snieckus in Lithuania. The VVER-440/230, which has not been approved by the Western specialists, can be found on the Kola Peninsula in Russia, in Armenia, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia.

The industrially developed states are proposing as a priority to enhance the operational safety of the AES's [nuclear electric power stations] by means of technological improvements, control systems, and better-quality staff training. Initial calculations show that this will cost up to \$170 million a year. So far the United States has allocated Russia \$40 million on a bilateral basis, and will be allocating another \$100 million over the next two to three years. More accurate calculations are expected to be made by the relevant international organizations.

These calculations will obviously contain not only financial estimates but also recommendations for the use of

alternative energy sources. After all, according to USIA, nuclear power stations currently supply 45 percent of Lithuania's electricity requirements, for instance, with the corresponding figures being 35 percent for Bulgaria, 28 percent for the CSFR, 25 percent for Ukraine, and 12 percent for Russia.

The international public's concern about the safety of our nuclear reactors is great. Particularly since the 1986 Chernobyl disaster—quite understandably. Seeing that we are unable to cope with our problems ourselves, our neighbors are prepared to help us out. Aid is aid, but—as the final communique from the Munich "G-7" summit stressed—"every state... is itself responsible for the safety of its nuclear power stations." That is entirely fair.

CIS General on Chemical Weapons in Baltic

PM2407084792 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 22 Jul 92 First Edition p 7

[Interview with Major General Professor Doctor Igor Yevstafyev, deputy chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces Chemical Troops and corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences, by Mikhail Gusev, place and date not given: "No Need To Rush To Fish for Bombs. Why Politicians Are Interested in the Mysterious Floor of the Baltic"—first four paragraphs are introduction]

[Text] Not just any sensation is enough to surprise presidents. George Bush the naval officer was hardly likely to know about the chemical weapons barbarically buried in the Baltic Sea. It is unlikely that George Bush the professional diplomat had ever heard about it. It is nard to imagine that George Bush the CIA director would not have known about it. But George Bush the president, on learning this oldish piece of news revealed by a Russian colleague during a transatlantic trip. expressed his surprise to the entire world. Which was quite enough to revive this totally "top secret" story, turning it into a sensation.

A sensation is what it was. Once. It remains a problem today. Problems last a long time, sensations just an hour. There is no need to be particularly surprised that this hour has come again. Things can get very strange in big-time politics. What is surprising is something else. In Helsinki our president again reiterated for the entire world to hear that the Baltic Sea will gradually be "blown up" by chemical shells eaten away by time and water. This was another sensation, but the person who "capitalizes" on it will be the winner.

With the presidents' encouragement scientists, businessmen, and statesmen have homed in on the underwater burial site. The Baltic's woes will produce major capital—monetary for some, political for others. One of the first to react was the head of the Latvian Supreme Council, who frightened the participants in an international forum in Switzerland with the prospect of the Baltic Sea dying from the military chemical content of German bombs dumped on the sea floor in 1947 off the

coast of Lithuania, Latvia, and Denmark by, Anatolijs Gorbunovs claims, the Soviet authorities. A lot of what he said in his intriguing statement was lies.

Lithuania and Latvia, in whose coastal waters nobody has ever dumped any chemicals, were cited by the Latvian leader for absolutely transparent reasons. The clearly exaggerated powers of the Soviet authoritiesalleged to have personally decided to dump the foreign poison-were a purely political and economic step: They dumped it, they should clear it up. Our authorities at the time, it should be noted, were shared [obshchiye], even if they were culpable. Various stories, accusations, and forecasts have poured into the newspapers, whipping up interest in the mysterious floor of the Baltic. What is down there? Whose heavy hand caused the damage? Who "ordered" the disaster and who will now have to pay for it? I put these questions to a recognized authority-Major General Professor Doctor Igor Yevstafvey. deputy chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces Chemical Troops and corresponding it imber of the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences.

[Gusev] Igor Borisovich, were we or were we not—and by "we" I mean the Union—to blame for the Baltic "burial site" which was kept secret for many years and surprised the U.S. President?

[Yevstafyev] I will answer your question with another question—what right did we have to personally dispose of the captured German arsenal? Bush could not fail to have known about the burial of the chemical agents, if only because dumping decisions, as well as others, were made by the United States too. In October 1943 the foreign ministers of the United States, Britain, and the USSR unambiguously advocated the demilitarization and disarmament of Germany under the control of, and following a program laid down by, the allied control commission and its special organs.

Then came the Berlin (Potsdam) Conference of the leaders of the three victorious powers. The 1 August 1945 protocol to the conference recorded: "All armaments, ammunition, and weapons of war together with all specialized means for their production should be under allied control or destroyed." In September 1945 a session of the Military Directorate decided to "destroy all stocks of military chemical agents and chemical munitions; and to destroy, burn, or dump at sea all chemical warfare agents."

The German chemical weapons were dumped in the Baltic immediately after the war, as attested by the materials of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. This is confirmed by Robert Harris and Jeremy Paxman in their book "A Higher Form of Killing: The Secret Chemical and Bacteriological War" and by surviving participants in the chemical dumping operation in the Baltic.

[Gusev] The press is currently giving the most varied figures for the amount of weapons dumped....

[Yevstafyev] The Stockholm Institute again believes that "at the very minimum no less than 20,000 tonnes of weapons were dumped in three places." But these tonnes also include the weight of shell and bomb casings. The dumping sites themselves are also known—the Skagerrak near the Norwegian coast, the outer roadstead off Kiel, and a point 20 miles east of the Danish island of Bornholm. There is nothing new or secret about this information. Incidentally, ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA discussed it back in June. More accurate information can be found in the control commission archives.

[Gusev] How fair is it to accuse Russia—as the Union's legal successor—of having committed an environmental crime?

[Yevstafvev] Current international law prohibits this means of getting rid of chemical weapons. The international convention on the prevention of pollution from ships specially lists the Baltic as being among the most environmentally vulnerable regions.

But the dumping of chemical munitions was carried out by the allies in the anti-Hitler coalition at a time when these norms of international law did not exist. Moreover, there was a widespread opinion both here and in the West that the sea was the most reliable place to bury waste. Furthermore, it would have been no less dangerous at the time to have left the chemical munitions on the territory of any European state.

[Gusev] But, judging by statements from our president and from completely official sources throughout Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia claiming that the chemical shells could "make their presence felt" at any time, this decision does not seem to have been very farsighted or safe.

[Yevstafyev] In my view, it is in practice unrealistic to create in a body of water a concentration of toxic agents or of the products of their decomposition that would endanger the biosphere. First, these agents hydrolyze, losing their toxic properties, and the speed with which they enter the atmosphere owing to their shell casings becoming less airtight over the course of time will be significantly lower for all types of toxic agents than the speed of their hydrolysis—their interaction with the water. Additionally, they are diffused in the water, and this is "helped" by underwater currents

[Gusev] But surely nothing stays underwater forever, much less shells....

[Yevstafyev] Cannon artillery munitions will remain airtight for 15-25 years at a depth of 50-200 meters.

[Gusev] Unfortunately, it seems that they started leaking a long time ago. What, in your opinion, has happened to their deadly contents?

[Yevstafyev] Mustard gas is virtually insoluble in water and the products of its hydrolysis are quite toxic, therefore we can expect the munitions that originally carried it to retain toxic products even after partial rust-through corrosion. But as long as the munitions are under a layer of silt they will pose no danger to the environment even after the casings have been completely destroyed. Lewisite is easily hydrolyzed, but it contains arsenic, all compounds of which are toxic. These are safer when covered by silt. Sarin, which is a particular worry for the Danes and Norwegians, is not present on the seabed—it was not produced back then.

The shells are most probably dispersed over a large area, overgrown with seaweed and barnacles, and covered with sand and silt. Even if they could be "counted" and detected, we would need to determine whether chemical agents were present in them. How would we determine whether they were airtight or whether hydrolysis had taken place? How would a corroded shell be brought to the surface? How would the chemical agent be destroyed and where would this happen? The modern technology developed in our country has been designed for a different type of munition.

[Gusev] Nonetheless, there is a problem and it cannot be avoided.

[Yevstafyev] It will be very expensive. If a decision is made to rid the floor of the Baltic of military chemicals, then the combination of cryogenic technology with technology for burning toxids while, naturally, purifying the waste gases, will look very attractive. Most probably, installations would have to be set up on mobile floating platforms, since transporting munitions raised from the seabed will be highly problematic, and the effectiveness and purposefulness of the work is not yet clear.

Captain First Class Yuriy Yefremov, chief of the Baltic Fleet's Chemical Service, is also confident that there has been no sudden massive discharge of toxic agents. Vasiliy Rodionov, a civilian and secretary for technology questions with the international commission for the protection of the Baltic Sea region maritime environment, sees no grounds for panic either.

But, despite all this, the Swedish newspaper SYDS-VENSKA DAGBLADET SNALLPOSTEN has shaken the world with a report that the German defense minister not only had a concrete plan for neutralizing the dumped munitions but had also generously proposed it to us and that we had arrogantly refused. If the newspaper's information is to be believed, the minesweepers Marburg, Koblenz, and Goettingen, which have experience of operations in the Persian Gulf, were prepared to bring the chemical munitions to the surface. But this is hard to believe. Anyway, bringing them to the surface is not the same thing as destroying them. H. Nilsson, a chemical agents expert at the Swedish Defense Research Center, believes that the "Stoltenberg plans are more akin to a political gesture than anything realistic," and that the danger of chemical agents being present in the seawater has been patently exaggerated.

The Baltic is a polluted sea. Unfortunately, poorer and poorer owners—Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Poland—live along its coastline. They cannot afford to shell out the \$22 billion which those in the know reckon

would be needed for a complete clean-up. Our former "sisters forever" in the Baltic have a vision of Russia as the rightful heir to all the sins of the former Union, hinting that it would be a good idea for it to spend some of the dollars it has borrowed from the West on "chemically cleaning" the Baltic seabed. They are not alone in their complaints. The West is not refusing to give technical assistance, but the politicians' new wave of interest in the fate of a foreign sea gives their well-off potential voters a chance for lucrative capital investment. It is undoubtedly a good cause, but it should just be looked at from both sides. We have plenty of things to spend money on-we just do not have the money.... During Yeltsin's visit to Helsinki it was decided that an international commission would draw up a program for raising and destroying the German shells. But, our unjustified sense of nonexistent guilt could cost our taxpayers very dear under this program.

Yet a far wealthier power—Britain—has been unenthusiastic about the Scandinavian idea of stopping the seabed being turned into a nuclear dumping ground, and, weighing up its abilities, replied that it could do nothing to help before 1998: There is nowhere left to put the waste. Incidentally, Britain is responsible for three quarters of all the nuclear waste that has officially been dumped in the Atlantic. The other countries on the list are not paupers either—Switzerland, the United States, Belgium....

Which in no way means that we should follow their example and give up on the Baltic. Of course it must be saved. But saved jointly. All the more so because it is now far more important to Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia than it is to Russia, which controls a far smaller area of the Baltic, whose industrial pollution has come not only and not so much from Russian shores. It is obvious that military chemical pollution is now less dangerous than industrial pollution, which continues to flow into this tragic semi-enclosed sea from sovereign shores. Bombs, shells, and weapons are words which impress politicians more than environmentalists. During election campaigns politicians will be happy to harp on about the dumped bombs to their "green" voters. Is is worth playing to the gallery on this subject? The process of cleaning the Baltic may be accelerated if this international problem becomes the focus of short-term policy. but it will hardly benefit from it.

There is no need to rush when fishing for bombs

Russia-U.S. Anti-Missile System Cooperation LD2507153192 Moscow Mayak Radio Network

LD250/153192 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 0730 GMT 25 Jul 92

[Interview with Aleksey Arbatov, director of the Strategic Research Center by Mayak commentator Lidiya Podolnya; place and date not given]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] [begin recording] [Lidiya Podolnya] Can one speak about parity, about equal participation by the two sides in creating this [joint U.S.-Russian anti-missile defense] system?

[Aleksey Arbatov] I think not, because in principle the United States does not need Russian participation in this

system. Its interests lie in providing orders for its own military-industrial complex. I do not want to blame them, that is a natural attitude and, you know, there is the principle: He who pays the piper calls the tune. In this case, it is the United States that is paying. This principle is still valid. It exists in business. Therefore, the United States is interested in deploying a system that would be to its own advantage. Consideration for the specific security interests of the other side is not very important in the Americans' thoughts.

Apart from anything else, there is something one must bear in mind, too. In view of the extreme instability in Russia, the United States cannot be certain how the situation will develop here. To agree to an exchange of technology and joint deployment of systems would mean making its system, which costs billions and into which vast resources have been invested, a hostage to the policy of another country. We, ourselves, are not could how the situation will develop in Russia. Can one imagine that the United States will wager everything on this eard? They are cautious and sensible people and, therefore, they are not going to transfer any such major technologies to us.

For another thing, the United States cannot be sure that the technology they transfer to us will not be used for other aims, for it is not possible to monitor this. The technology is such that some of it can be used for both offensive and defensive purposes. The United States cannot be certain that this technology will not get into the hands of other countries via us

[Podolnya] Taking account of what you have said, in this situation what are the prospects for the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile [ABM] Treaty⁹

[Arbatov] The Americans have long proposed renouncing this treaty Previously, we asserted that this treaty was very important for strategic stability and that it should not be renounced. There are now certain internal contradictions in our position. On the one hand, we say that we are prepared to cooperate with the United States, and on the other we continue to adhere to the idea that the treaty is important for strategic stability and security.

In principle, of course, the ABM Treaty is not holy writ. It is a treaty, and if national interests change, then the treaty can be changed too, or replaced by another different treaty. Before changing anything in the treaty it is necessary to look again at all these questions. What are the real threats to Russia's security' What are the prospects for cooperation with the United States in the sphere of deploying such a system'. Do we have the resources for such a system'. What other means could there be to deal with the same threat' For example, in order to defend oneself against an arranchioned launching of a missile one rould have instead of an anti-missile defense system a more registion system of

preventing an unsanctioned launch, that is a system of control and communications that excludes such a possibility

All of this should be subjected to very serious analys's, not in secret but with the involvement of the broadest circles of specialists from various spheres of knowledge

[Podolnya] Returning to the delegation that has just been to Moscow. Can one say that anything was achieved."

[Arbatov] The sides made a step forward. They agreed in principle, or, to be more accurate, they are now going along the path of cooperating in creating a warning system that includes space components. This is undoubtedly a correct and rational approach. I think that the political result is that the United States now regards every step in this sphere, including the joint development of space sensors, as a step toward renouncing the ABM Treaty. But, thank God, we still adhere to the ABM Treaty, and we say that it is necessary to create some things jointly—space sensors, for example—but without violating the ABM Treaty. We and the United States are pulling in different directions. [end recording]

Russian Experts on Revising Anti-Missile Treaty

OW 2707124592 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1217 GMT 27 Jul 92

[From the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The anti-missile defence treaty should be revised since it hinders the implementation of the project for building a global defence system coordinated between the Russian and American Presidents. The International Security Council (ISC) said so in its resolution adopted in Washington recently on the results of a meeting between Russian and American experts.

According to the resolution, the anti-missile detence treaty will hinder not only the implementation of the project for building a global defence system, but also the efforts to work it out.

Those who share this view are Russian generals Gheliy Batenin and Viktor Samoilov, their American colleague Michael Dugan, former Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Forse, Aleksandr Savelvev, Deputy Director of the Moscow Institute for Strategic Studies, Joseph Churba, President of the ISC, Ambassador Henry Cooper, Director of the Strategic Defence Initiative Organization, Stepan Sulaishin, President Yeltsin's personal representative in the Tomsk region and one of the leading scientists in high-power lasers and space technologies, and a number of other Russian and American experts.

What underlies the anti-missile defence treaty is the idea that the two sides will refrain from building global anti-missile systems, including a global deferre system. Aleksandr Savelyes. Deputy Director of the Moscow.

Institute for Strategic Studies, told DP's [Diplomatic Panorama's] correspondent.

According to him, the very idea of global defence system conflicts with the idea of the anti-missile defence treaty "Because of this the treaty becomes an obstacle"

Besides, there is a "purely technical" reason. The antimissile defence treaty does not make it possible to deploy the most effective systems of protection against ballistic missiles, such as a space-based system. This involves not only "interceptors", that is "strike weapons", but also targeting, spotting and escorting systems. "These systems are indispensable in creating reliable defence"

"I do not quite understand those who speak in favor of preserving the anti-missile defence treaty and at the same time call for launching together with the U.S. work designed to build a global defence system", said A. Savelyev.

According to him, this discrepancy must not be ignored. "Signed during the cold war in order to halt the arms race, the anti-missile defence treaty was good for its time but it has already played its role". Now it becomes an obstacle to the development of Russian-American relations.

A. Savelyev believes that this issue requires a radical solution. "The new quality of the Russian-American relationship points to the need to work out new agreements that would make it possible to carry out joint work and confirm the present level of bilateral relations"

Government Urged to Rethink Global Nuclear Agenda

International Cooperation Stressed

92WP0266A Madras THE HINDU in English 25 Jun 92 p 8

[Article by C. Raja Mohan]

[Excerpts] The first Russian-American summit last week has turned all the conventional wisdom on nuclear arms control upside down and inside out. The arms control agreements signed by the Presidents, Mr. Boris Yeltin and Mr. George Bush have set in motion one of the largest nuclear force reductions ever. At the same time, the two leaders have also buried the lynchpin of arms control for nearly two decades, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. In doing so they have together set in motion the joint development of a mini Star Wars project. [passage omitted]

By any count, the strategic arms reduction agreement signed by Mr. Bush and Mr. Yeltin is indeed impressive. Over two phases stretching towards the year 2003, the Russian and American nuclear arsenals would be down two-thirds from the current levels. Taken together with

the earlier decisions by Washington and Moscow to eliminate all tactical nuclear weapons, the latest accord is truly a milestone

While international attention has been focussed on the far-reaching nuclear cuts, a major development at the summit has been widely ignored. The two Presidents have agreed to explore the possibilities of joint development of technologies for defences against limited missile attacks, an euphemism for the scaled down version of the controversial Star Wars system first proposed by Mr. Ronald Reagan in 1983.

Since then the Strategic Defence Initiative, or Star Wars, had been a major obstacle to arms control. When Mr. Reagan suggested possible sharing of Star Wars technologies with the Soviet Union, most observers had dismissed it as a propaganda gimmick. The Soviet Union saw Star Wars as the most destabilising strategic development, aimed at giving the United States strategic superiority over the Soviet Union

Acrimonious differences over the Star Wars programme and its impact on the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missiles Treaty that severely limited the development and deployment of missile defences blocked much of the Soviet-American negotiations on START throughout the 1980s.

Within the United States the strong initial opposition to Star Wars deployment began to wear thin. Even as the threat from the Soviet Union began to diminish, the Bush Administration skilfully used the exaggerated threat of third world missiles to justify the continued American funding of Star Wars. The grandiose objectives of the Star Wars project were scaled down from the creation of a dome against nuclear attacks to one of global protection against limited missile strikes (GPALS). The Gulf War and the use of Scud missiles by Mr. Saddam Hussein of Iraq helped forge an American consensus in favour of the son of Star Wars.

Internationally, the weakening Soviet Union had begun to lose much of the arms control leverages on Star Wars. By July 1991, Mr. Gorbachev was himself proposing joint development with the U.S. of strategic defence technologies. This offer was later repeated by Mr. Yeltsin.

The two sides are now ready to consider the joint development of SDI technologies, sharing of early-warning information on ballistic missile launches, and devising an appropriate international legal framework for such cooperation. The last element is a polite way of stating that Moscow is letting Washington pull down one of the pillars of Soviet-American arms control, the ABM Treaty.

Although the Russians may be interested in the cooperative development of the GPALS system. Washington is unlikely to give an equal status to Russia in the development of strategic defences. The Bush Administration has succeeded in politically co-opting the Russians into the CPALS, with the offer of technology sharing.

Together, the deep cuts in the nuclear arsenals of Washington and Moscow and the cooption of Russia into the Strategic Defence Initiative may well begin to alter the dynamics of international nuclear politics.

The unequal cuts in nuclear weapons imposed by the United States at the Washington summit and the discarding of the notion of strategic parity confirms the current international primacy of the United States. Russia has now formally accepted a secondary status in the international nuclear hierarchy.

The sweeping cuts now set in motion by Mr. Bush and Mr. Yeltsin have helped increase the political pressure on the minor nuclear powers, France, Britain and China. Until now the minor nuclear powers could argue that given the slow pace of Soviet-American disarmament, there is little reason for cuts in their own arsenals. That argument will no longer hold water. The planned nuclear build-up of these three will now come under greater international scrutiny and criticism.

At the political level, the special relationship now instituted between Russia and America restructures the European balance of power in American favour. Despite the economic decline of the United States and the lowering of its military profile in Europe, Washington now has a firm handle in the management of multipolarity in Europe. The prospect of an autonomous European power centre has now become a distant one. Washington is in a position to block the emergence of either a Russo-German axis or a Franco-German alliance that could challenge the strategic primacy of the U.S. in Europe.

By forcing Moscow to shed its ambitions of strategic parity with Washington, and seducing Moscow into the joint development of a mini-Star Wars programme, the Bush Administration is now well placed to cut the smaller nuclear powers to size. The Washington accords also bolster the Bush Administration's policy of beefing up the international non-proliferation regime and elevating the NPT into a universal law. It will be difficult to argue after the present cuts that the nuclear superpowers have not kept their bargain under the NPT. The United States is now well-placed to extend the NPT indefinitely in 1995.

As one of the three main holdouts against the NPT, the other two being Israel and Pakistan, India needs carefully to rethink the global disarmament agenda it has been pursuing all these years. It is no longer credible for New Delhi to flog the Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan for Disarmament presented by the late Prime Minister at the United Nations in 1988. The international political context and the disarmament agenda have undergone a sea change.

While continuing to argue for the long-term goal of eliminating the nuclear weapons, India must come up with demands for credible interim measures. These could include the immediate participation of minor nuclear powers in the disarmament process, transferring the custody of existing nuclear weapons to the United Nations pending their elimination, the internationalisation of certain aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle like plutonium reprocessing and uranium enrichment, and international cooperation in managing the fissionable material that will be released by the current disarmament process.

Equally important, India must recognise that the strategy of keeping its nuclear option open will no longer be credible. India must quickly move towards converting its nuclear capability into a small nuclear arsenal that will only bolster India's leverage in pushing for a new agenda of global nuclear arms control.

New Delhi also needs to redefine its attitude to the Star Wars programme. With the doctrinal emphasis shifting from offensive nuclear weapons to strategic defence. India needs to stress international cooperation among democratic States in the development of the GPALS.

If India continues to be surrounded by missiles and nuclear powers, it has as much right to protection against these threats as any one else. Besides, as the strategic utility of nuclear weapons begins to diminish, the GPALS could unleash a range of military technologies that could determine the locus of power in the new international order.

Reformulation Needed

92WP0266B Madras THE HINDU in English 20 Jun 92 p 8

[Text] The agreement reached between United States and Russia for reduction in the stockpiles of intercontinental ballistic missiles and nuclear warheads is no doubt a big step forward. The agreement will, however, keep the world waiting for another 10 to 12 years before the stockpile of nuclear warheads with either of the United States and Russia would drop to between 3,000 and 4,000 which is about a third of their present arsenal. This will still be a menacing number even a decade later.

A great deal will depend upon both Mr. Boris Yeltsin and Mr. George Bush successfully persuading the republics of the erstwhile USSR against seeking any advantage from the strategic location of the warheads in their territory. Even while it was engaged in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks in the 1970s and later when it was negotiating the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty with the monolithic Soviet Union, the United States regarded as very real the risk of the two countries being drawn into an "accidental" nuclear war.

An agreement signed by the former U.S. Secretary of State William P. Rogers and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko provided for elaborate measures to "guard against accidental or unauthorised use of nuclear weapons." It now becomes necessary for the United States and Russia to negotiate such agreements with the independent republics having nuclear armoury. It is indeed ironic that when so much is being talked about

the end of the Cold War the task facing both the United States and Russia during the 1990s to ensure that nuclear warheads scattered all over the erstwhile USSR do not menace the world could be far more arduous than it had been during the years when the writ of the rulers in Moscow ran over their extensive realm

The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty of the 1980s had already provided for reductions in Intercontinental Ballistic Missile capabilities of the United States and the Soviet Union and the dismantling of the sites for different classes of missiles on either side in the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. The dismemberment of the Soviet Union would make the compliance with the obligations under START by the now independent republics imperative to ensure that the START remains fully operative. The break-up of the Soviet Union, the consequent dispersal of its nuclear capability among the independent republics and the heartbreaking task of having to make sure that such capability does not jeopardise peace in the world should also incidentally induce second thoughts in the U.S. Administration on the fairness of its efforts to impose its anti-nuclear proliferation policy on the non-nuclear states.

The present arms control agreement which the United States and Russia have signed will still leave the two countries with nuclear warheads of between 3,000 and 4,000 ten years later. And the two countries will have to reconcile with the Russian component of this nuclear capability being shared by the other republics which have become independent states. With nuclear weaponry having become already so widely dispersed and with Russia or the United States not being in a position to do anything about it, there can be no justification for denying the acquisition of nuclear capability by countries like India by the United States or other members of the nuclear weapons club. It is indeed very strange even ridiculous—that with nuclear proliferation having already become so very extensive the United States presumes to remain so very committed against such proliferation. The need for reformulation of their nuclear policy should by now have become very obvious to the United States and the other powers which share its views

Russian Minister Mikhaylov on Arsenal Reduction

PM2307114392 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 22 Jul 92 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Viktor Mikhaylov by O Volkov and A. Khokhlov; place and date not given: "Nuclear Danger Is No More Than a Myth. That Is What Russian Nuclear Minister Viktor Mikhaylov Believes"]

[Excerpts] [KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Viktor Nikitovich, vou have been involved in science your whole life and you have created nuclear weapons and systems to mountor them. How do you view the recent disarmament accords?

[Victor Mikhaylov] I always said we did not need so many weapons. After all, we had over 25,000 nuclear munitions: warheads, mines, and shells—that is simply terrible! The quantity of weapons has now become a matter of quality and is threatening to become uncontrollable. So arsenals must be reduced

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] How soon will this happen?

[Mikhaylov] Unfortunately, it will take us a while to get rid of them. It will take at least 10 years, and considerable expenditure.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Where will the weapons be destroyed?

[Mikhaylov] At our enterprises—in Krasnoyarsk. Tomsk, and Yekaterinburg—and in the places where they were assembled: Zlatoust, Penza, Arzamas, and Nizhnyaya Tura.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Are there sufficient capacities?

[Mikhaylov] The Americans visited recently, and I said to them: If you have problems with this, bring yours over here. We will also dismantle your weapons—for a moderate fee.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] U.S. scientists are continuing to develop [razrabotka] third-generation nuclear weapons. What about our scientists?

[Mikhaylov] Scientific programs are under way, but without real-life experiments. The moratorium Russia announced last year is still in force.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Are we already a long way behind?

[Mikhaylov] No.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Will tests be resumed at Novava Zemlya in October, when the moratorium expires?

[Mikhaylov] In all probability there may be tests in 1993.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Tell us a military secret: Will these explosions be weapons tests or are they for peaceful purposes?

[Mikhaylov] What secret is there—they will be weapons tests

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] We have heard that the "Chetek" company has made a promise to foreigners to start destroying their chemical waste this year by means of nuclear explosions. Is this true? [Mikhaviov] This firm offered its services in financing some of the Arzamas-16 conversion programs in 1990, when our appropriations were drastically cut. Permission was received from the leadership of the former USSR. "Chetek" invested 10 million rubles [R], including in the technological studies [razrabotki] you mention. For our part, we promised the businessmen a share of the profits if this program is launched and brings in profits. "Chetek" took the risk. I believed and I still do believe that private capital can be involved in conversion programs. So I gave my agreement.

Foday "Chetek" is having some difficulties, and we have not renewed the contract with it. But if the technology "works out." the company has the right to some of the profits because of the capital it has invested.

!KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Is it going to work?

[Mikhaylov] Everything still has to be weighed up. I think next year we will submit the plan for expert environmental assessment, international assessment, if you like. Although there are quite a lot of alternative proposals that do not involve nuclear explosions. The winner will be the plan that is cleanest from the environmental viewpoint, entails the smallest risk of consequences, and is economically advantageous.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] You are about to go to the United States. What is the purpose of the trip?

[Mikhaylov] I will be discussing a whole series of problems with Energy Secretary Watkins. One of them is the possibility of selling highly enriched uranium-235. We have to earn hard currency.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] To whom are you going to sell it?

[Mikhaylov] We are intending to sell uranium in the form of fuel elements to firms and countries to which the U.S. Department of Nuclear [as published] Energy formerly sold it. Our quota is very small—just 5 or 6 percent of world trade, or just \$300-400 million in money terms. We want to increase our quota in order to obtain as much again.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Why are the Americans interested in such sales? Are the prices low?

[Mikhaylov] No. There was an instance when we sold a consignment of output at low prices—last year. But now in the United States there is an entire protest campaign. The U.S. Department of Commerce believes that we have caused losses to U.S. enterprises. However, American experts today admit that Russia did not sell uranium at below prime cost. So far as they were concerned this was dumping, but it is just that our technology is better and wages are low.....

The Americans' interest lies elsewhere. They need to modernize their uranium enrichment plants. I am not saying their technology is backward, but ours consumes 20 times less power, so prime cost is low. Meanwhile

their Department of Energy does not want to lose its "nuclear" customers, and so it is temporarily ready to sell our uranium to its customers

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] In general, this is as "advantageous" as selling crude oil

[Mikhaylov] This is not the crude oil trade. Of course, uranium reserves are limited—although we have 45 percent of the world reserves, incidentally. Even without weapons-grade uranium we have more than enough fuel There are entire deposits! All the storage facilities are full. So what are we supposed to do, just hoard it all? Or try to sell at least some of it? After all, if we were to sell even 10-20 percent of this quantity, it would mean billions of dollars. Not credits from the world community, but honestly earned money!

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Will we be able to sell it? What is your view of the situation on the international market for nuclear materials?

[Mikhaylov] Not a cold war, but a real "hot" war is under way there. Russia is trying to fight its way in

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Who actually sells the uranium: the ministry? The government? Businessmen?

[Mikhaylov] Today uranium is sold directly by the producer enterprises. Under our ministry's control, of course. All decisions to sell go through the government The rules are similar in the West. So you could say that the state. Russia, sells it

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] What about the other republics of the former USSR?

[Mikhaylov] We have managed to reach agreements with the CIS uranium-producing countries. They all now sell uranium only via "Tekhsnabeksport." That is to everyone's advantage.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Won't the uranium that is sold come back later in the form of waste that we will have to bury?

[Mikhaylov] No. We will sell it as raw material and take nothing back. In general waste is one of the most painful problems today. For some reason people did not think about it before.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Indeed. I have often heard it said that nuclear power is regarded as cheap only because the costs of reprocessing and burying radioactive waste are not taken into account.

[Mikhaylov] That is not quite true. Feasibility studies today take the whole cycle into account

Today we have new techniques for reprocessing waste. We now know how to construct the nuclear power stations of the future: They will accumulate radioactive substances which will go back into the fuel cycle after reprocessing. [passage omitted]

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] But to whom are we going to write off the losses? All this disarray primarily affects people working in the nuclear sector. Can there be any question of safety when one "nuclear" city after another is threatening to go on strike?

[Mikhaylov] Recently there was a plenum of the Nuclear Power and Industry Workers Union Central Committee, and it was both painful and bitter for me, as the minister, to hear people. Indeed, a prestrike situation has now been declared in Krasnoyarsk. Arzamas, and Krasnokamensk. For several months workers in the sector have not been receiving their pay, there is no cash. The government promised to resolve this question by I July. What is the date today? So there you are....

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Are you not afraid the scientists will flee abroad?

[Mikhaylov] That is a separate issue. People have long been trying to prove that there is total chaos and mayhem in our country. But none of our specialists has gone abroad. This is all fantasy. The people who are periodically portrayed as Soviet "nuclear specialists" in the West were not closely involved with our military secrets. The CIS has decided at intergovernmental level to control all scientists in any way involved in weapons production.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] So are nuclear specialists doomed to be banned from traveling abroad for their whole lives?

[Mikhaylov] Why? For instance, a conference of mayors of closed cities of the "nuclear cycle" was held recently—abroad, in Norway. I think the cost was justified, because we must learn to communicate with our foreign colleagues. Unless we now open up the closed cities a little to the outside world, it will be simply impossible to live and work there.

Admittedly, in choosing Norway I was also pursuing another aim: We have to respond somehow to the constant reproaches from our Scandinavian neighbors about Novaya Zemlya. There are no "horrors" there. Since they do not believe me personally, I thought, maybe they will believe people living actually at Russia's nuclear facilities?

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Did they believe them?

[Mikhaylov] I do not know. But for the umpteenth time they asked how I can sleep in a country crammed with sources of radioactivity. I sleep soundly. Like a log.

Mikhaylov Seeks U.S. Assistance in Conversion

LD2407080792 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1600 GMT 23 Jul 92

[Excerpt] Mikhaylov, Russian minister of atomic power engineering, has held talks in Washington aimed at involving U.S. companies in rendering assistance to Russia in converting nuclear materials used for military purposes into fuel for atomic power stations. The U.S. side has not yet produced definite answers to Russian proposals, ITAR-TASS has reported. [passage omitted]

Russian Rocket Deal With India Detailed

92WP0267 Madras THE HINDU in English 26 Jun. 92 p 1

[Quotation marks as published]

[Text] New Delhi, June 25—The Russian deal for supplof two cryogenic engines for rocket launching and subsequent transfer of technology "is definitely on and as per schedule," the chairman of the Indian Space Research Organisation [ISRO], Dr. U.R. Rao. said here last night. (He was on his way to French Guyana to review the preparations for the launch of INSAT-2A scheduled for July 9.)

About Rupees 70 crores, being first installment for the Rupees 235-crore deal, was paid to the Russian Glavks-smos Space Agency in January this year.

The first launch with cryogenic engine was slated for 1995 and all indications were the schedule would be adhered to

The Missile Technology Control Regime [MTCR] was an ad hoc arrangement among seven countries, and Russia was not a signatory to it.

Dr. Rao said that according to the contract, the first two rocket engines would be designed and fabricated in Russia. After the transfer of technology, the third and fourth engines, which together with the first two, would form part of the GSLV (Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle) system, would be developed indigenously by India. "Ultimately, we have to depend upon ourselves."

Dr. Rao said the cryogenic engines could not be bought off the shelf and a series of tests were required for every design. Joint designs and technical parameters had been finalised.

"We have to set up special test facilities and fabrication units. Welding technologies are different, new materials, engineering, etc.—every parameter will have to be perfected. We will indigenise as much as possible."

In answer to a question, Dr. Rao said he did not envisage any change in the overall cost of the GSLV programme. Rupees 750 crores, including Rupees 235 crores for the cryogenic engines deal with Russia. The Space Commission had reviewed the project. The project report was being rewritten on the basis of this review.

Dr. Rao said the offer of the engine technology came from the Russian side. Similar offers had come earlier from the U.S. and France, but they were not cost-effective. Besides, while France offered complete transfer of technology with a simple single-start engine.

the U.S. enterprise, General Dynamics, offered a multiple-start engine. "We'd have liked two starts. Then came the Russian Glavkosmos Space Agency offer at Rupees 500 crores to 600 crores which was finally negotiated at Rupees 235 crores and we went back to the Space Commission and got their approval."

There was no understanding of cryogenics in India, and the country's efforts at indigenous development could have led to delays, cost over-runs and 'possible failures', whereas in the present deal with Russia, at least there was 'a certainty of delivery'.

Asked about the impact of the U.S. ban on the ISRO, Prof. Rao said there would be problems in getting many equipment and components such as micro-processors and resins. "However, we will find parallel sources," he said, stressing the need for indigenous development of electronic components.

Referring to the ASLV [Asynchroneous Launch Vehicle] launch earlier this month (in the third attempt), Prof. Rao said a successful launch was more important in that project, than the payload. The satellite was doing well and the data received from it "was beautiful." Its life would be 70 to 80 days, and not 100 days as envisaged earlier. It was expected to survive till July-end.

Had there not been an ignition failure in the first unsuccessful launch of the ASLV, the second failure could have been avoided. Nothing could be learnt from the ignition failure. But in the second failure, after the first stage, there were lessons to be learnt, for instance in winds and gusts, strap-ons, etc.

Dr. Rao was optimistic about the launch of the PSLV (Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle) before March next year, while the INSAT-IIA was ready for launch on the midnight of July 9 from French Guyana.

Dr. Rao and Dr. K. Kasturirangan, Director of the ISRO Satellite Centre today left for Kourou, French Guyana, to review the preparations for the launch of first-indigenously built satellite, INSAT-2A aboard the European launch vehicle, Ariane.

Russia Eyes Japan's Plutonium Reactor Cautiously

LD2707090392 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0745 GMT 27 Jul 92

[By TASS observer Veronica Romanenkova]

[Text] Moscow July 27 TASS—The development and the creation of a nuclear reactor capable of producing electricity through burning plutonium, which is left over as a result of dismantling nuclear weapons of the former Soviet Union, is profitable from the economic point of view, but is politically dangerous. The director of the Institute of Safe Development of Nuclear Power, Leonid Bolshov, told ITAR-TASS "the use of plutonium for commercial purposes will require the same strict control

as in the case of its military production". If plutonium is used as a fuel for a nuclear reactor, a sharp rise in the threat of terrorism is not ruled out. Although this danger is obvious, but not the only one.

The idea of the creation of such a reactor exists since long. But according to Leonid Bolshov, the research work in this sphere in Russia and the U.S. and Japan still remains in its initial stage. Besides this, the fuel preparation technology also needs a considerable degree of perfection as plutonium is a "chemically capricious" element.

Even then the Japanese Government decided to go ahead with the development of such a reactor, according to reports published recently in Japanese newspapers. The site of the new reactor's construction is yet to be finalised, but, probably, it will be built on the Russian territory. This report was said to have been based on the recent G-7 Munich Summit's declaration which clearly mentioned "provision of help to Russia in destroying nuclear facilities".

Brt after all what lies behind Japan's "support" proposal to Russia in the creation of a new reactor? It seems most logical that Russia will accept the "help" from its neighbour, and the Japanese Government, which is interested in cooperation, will provide the finances for the development works. But most probably, the Japanese will get the right to conduct the research work.

Firstly, because it will be profitable to the Japanese Government: An unusual reactor (Japan's priority), new technologies and materials will be created, science will make a considerable headway, and a large number of scientists, engineers and technologists will get jobs. Such an agreement will please Japanese specialists as well. They will receive finances from the state (a tough struggle is on in Japan to get a right to fulfill a government order) and they will be busy with an interesting project for a long time to come.

Thus, money will actually never reach Russia.

As far as Russian specialists are concerned, according to the Ministry of Atomic Energy's estimates, they themselves are capable of creating a plutonium reactor. But, at present, Russian nuclear scientists have too many of urgent work to attend to. First of all, they have to ensure the maximum safety of functioning nuclear power plants. At present, Russia has nine of them with 28 energy generating blocks. Besides it, they are experiencing financial difficulties. According to the Atomic Energy Ministry, the involvement of foreign investments can only expedite the process of finding a solution to the reliability problems of our nuclear power plants by our specialists.

Russian Nuclear Scientists Threaten Strike

LD2607084792 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0724 GMT 26 Jul 92

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Evald Kessariisky]

[Text] Nizhny Movgorod July 26 TASS—Scientists and employees of the Russian nuclear centre Arzamas-16 have warned they will stop work if no measures are taken to supply them with cash.

"The Russian Government does not fulfill its own decision on the top-priority funding of nuclear research centres. We received our salary for May only after numerous appeals to various authorities, including personally to Yegor Gaydar," Valery Punin, head of one of the nuclear centre departments, said.

Punin said the employees will stop all activities, including dismantling nuclear charges, if the government does not take measures to normalise cash supply to the centre.

Russian Plutonium Reactors Closed for Conversion

LD2507175092 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 0600 GMT 24 Jul 92

[Text] By a decision of the Collegium of the State Committee for Safety in Industry and Atomic Power Industry two Russian reactors for the production of plutonium for nuclear weapons have been closed down in Krasnoyarsk and in Tomsk. Thus only three will remain in Russia. The conversion program envisages the building in Krasnoyarsk-26 of a factory to produce polycrystal silicon and materials for semiconductor technology. In two or three years time 200 tonnes will be produced. Apart from that it is proposed to organize at the combine the production of particularly pure materials—gallium arsenide, germanium, and tellurium.

Russian Supreme Soviet on CBW Commitments

PM2407135092 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 24 Jul 92 First Edition p 4

["Resolution of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet on Ensuring the Fulfillment of the Russian Federation's International Commitments in the Sphere of Chemical, Bacteriological (Biological), and Toxin Weapons," No. 3244-1]

[Text] Having examined the state of fulfillment of the Russian Federation's international commitments in the sphere of chemical, bacteriological (biological), and toxin weapons, the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet resolves:

1. To confirm the Russian Federation's status as legal successor to the USSR's commitments under the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development. Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (1972) and under bilateral Soviet-U.S. accords on the control of chemical weapons and the destruction of stockpiles, and also to confirm the commitment to the policy of concluding a global convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

- 2. The Russian Federation president is recommended to submit to the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet draft legislative acts of the Russian Federation on the prohibition, in line with the Russian Federation's international commitments, of the development, production, and stockpiling of chemical, bacteriological (biological), and toxin weapons, and on the liability of officials for violations of the said commitments.
- 3. It is deemed expedient to allocate as a separate item in the Russian Federation republic budget, under the heading "Implementation of international treaties on the elimination, reduction, and limitation of arms," appropriations for expenditure, including expenditure in freely convertible currency, associated with the fulfillment of the Russian Federation's international commitments on matters relating to conventions on chemical and biological weapons.
- 4. The Russian Federation Government, in conjunction with the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Committee on Industry and Power Generation and the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Committee on Questions of Ecology and the Rational Use of Natural Resources, is instructed to submit to the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet by 15 September 1992 draft comprehensive programs for the phased destruction of chemical weapons and the utilization of the specialized biotechnological potential to organize the development and production of medical preparations.

[Signed] Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Chairman R.I. Khasbulatov. Moscow, Russian House of Soviets [Dated] 8 July 1992.

Negligent Handling of Radioactive Materials

PM2307150692 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 16 Jul 92 Morning Edition p 6

[Report by Viktor Belikov: "Radiation Rash on the Map of Moscow"]

[Text] Every year between 50 and cheer 80 areas of dangerous radioactive emission are discovered on the territory of Moscow by the specially trained "Geoekotsentr" patrols.

In the last 10 years they have identified more than 600 such sources, which were subsequently deactivated (see map on the left). The second map which we reproduce reflects the situation regarding identified sources of radiation today; work to eliminate them is being carried out. The marks of different pattern and color denote the various degrees of radioactivity, and therefore of danger

Until very recently material about these "finds" was considered top secret, and was hidden from the general public, although each one was immediately reported to the local authorities, civil defense, and other departments who were supposed to know and to take the appropriate measures. Leonid Ivanovich Dmitrakov,

general director of "Geoekotsentr," and his specialists believe that the total secrecy which for many years covered up any incidents of loss of control over sources of radioactive isotopes inflicted great damage. To this day a large section of the population has not becauseuleated with the necessary caution or developed the necessary heightened caution in dealing with the true monster of our technological age—radiation

It is like AIDS. Not manifesting itself initially, it penetrates unopposed deep within, spreads far and wide, and inflicts irreparable damage to all living things

"Unfortunately, this is no exaggeration," in the assertion of my companions V. Yegoshin, an operator, and V. Seleznev, driver of the patrol jeep, whom I was able to accompany on a special assignment through the streets of Moscow. "A large proportion of the radioactive objects uncovered bear obvious traces of misuse: scratches, signs of wear, dents. These objects look harmless, but radiate so much that the dosimeters go off the scale! What can you say about the war museums or the amateur science laboratories in schools or vocational and technical colleges to which they indiscriminately consign old indicators with luminous dials, faces, or pointers, which also give out a hefty dose of microroentgens?"

Thanks to the motorized patrols, which are then supplemented by foot patrols, virtually all so-called localized and small-scale [ploshchadnyye] radioactive sites are detected.

Those responsible for their emergence are usually among the 1,500 enterprises, institutes, and laboratories of industrial Moscow which use radioactive substances. A negligent laboratory technician who dumps an ampule containing an isotope into the street trash can. A driver who is too lazy to drive a dangerous load destined for burial to the remote site, and dumps it on a chance vacant plot in the city. Or simply a pilfering employee who takes a fancy to the massive lead shield covering a source of ionizing radiation. These examples, like dozens of similar ones, are unfortunately taken from the daily chronicle of the "Geockotsentr" patrol service.

My interlocutors believe that control over the movement and use of radioactive isotopes has weakened recently, and must be tightened up. The Moscow City Public Health and Epidemiological Station and its subdepartments in the okrugs must be given the right of unrestricted access to all facilities which give rise to doubts as to their radiation cleanliness. At the present time, higher education establishments and institutes have been removed from such extradepartmental control, which, incidentally, was the cause of the months of contamination recently detected in laboratories and other premises of the Moscow State Technical University (the former Bauman University)

The numerous MP's [expansion unknown] and cooperatives which are springing up like mushrooms are trying to work with fissionable materials in an amateurish fashion, without properly training their personnel, who

lack the basic knowledge in the specific sphere of safety practices. One such "expert" in pursuit of profit contrived to contaminate the waste disposal unit in his house with radionuclides to such an extent that the standpipe had to be completely replaced. He irradiated himself with a dose five times in excess of the permissible norm! The criminal sentence delivered to him by the court hardly affected this doomed man's fate

In parting I inquired how deactivation—the destruction of a radiation source—is carried out. If it is a point source and of a small size it is carefully picked up with pincers and placed in special packaging or a special container. If the dimensions or the area of contamination is large then the job cannot be done without bull-dozers, excavators, and other heavy equipment. Then the specialized "Radion" science and production association is brought in, which knows how to act in any situation

Army's Radium-226 'Contamination' in Omsk Noted

PM2107131192 Moscow Teleradiokompaniya Ostankino Television First Program Network in Russian 0500 GMT 16 Jul 92

[Video report by V. Morozova and K. Dudin, from Omsk, from the "Novosti" nescast—figures in brackets denote broadcast time in GMT in hours, minutes, and seconds]

[Text] [050730] [Announcer to camera] Buried sources of strong radioactivity have been discovered in Omsk in the vicinity of the airport

[Morozova] The story of the find is quite simple, really People digging out a foundation trench for a residential house came across mysterious boxes. They checked out the containers—the counters bleeped. Against a norm of 30 units, the instruments registered almost 8,000 microroentgens per hour. It was the military who left this "present" behind.

[V.A. Kudryavtsev, head of the "Ochag" enterprise] Instruments with various luminous dials used in aircraft were buried here at one time. The luminous material contained radium-226

[Morozova] Radium-226 is a uranium salt, and all this happened on a site which used to belong to a military unit. Later a residential area grew up nearby

[Unidentified woman] Criminals, this is what I call the leadership of that military unit! I am not afraid to use this word. For years they had containers here where they dumped their instruments. Children played with those instruments all over the neighborhood.

[Morozova] Since the military secret has been exposed and the site decontaminated. Omsk's little "Chernobyl" has practically been eliminated. But grounds for concern

remain. According to the oblast hygiene and epidemiological center, there are still more than 200 radioactive contamination sites on Omsk's territory. [050857] [video shows site, radiation being measured]

Status of Biological Lab Remains Unclear

92WN0660A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA ın Russian 1 Jul 92 p 6

[Letter to NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA from Damir Safulin: "Will the Secret Laboratory Not Move From Kazakhstan to Russia? The Bacteriological 'Sand Dune' on Vozrozhdeniye Island Continues To Alarm the Public"]

[Text] I read in your newspaper for 23 June 1992 an article by Sergey Kozlov which discussed the bacteriological laboratory on Vozrozhdeniye Island in the Aral Sea. The article is entitled "Scientists Have Abandoned Secret Laboratory." It says there: "The doors and windows of the residential buildings, barracks, and the laboratory facility itself have been boarded up since last year."

My son, Vladimir Safulin, who was recruited into the army in June 1991, requested to serve precisely in Aralsk-5 and on this very Vozrozhdeniye Island, which in the unit (military unit 25484-R, which is part of a larger unit located in the city of Aralsk-5) and in the Russian General Staff is called "Sand Dune." Quartered on the island last year was a whole regiment, in which my son, the commander of a division of 54 men, served.

After a great deal of difficulty he and his subordinates were ultimately transferred to Moscow. In order to accomplish this, we—a group of parents—had to push our way through to get a meeting with General Shukalin in the General Staff. What caused the parents to demand a transfer to Russia was something traditional for our army—hazing and the increasingly frequent cases of beating up on military servicemen (even officers) by the local population. My son's division was transferred to Moscow on 26 April 1991.

And so military servicemen were still quartered on the "Sand Dune" at the end of April. To be fair, one must say that by that time there was really no civilian population there

S Kozlov's article quotes the words of Mukhtar Shakhanov, president of the "Aral-Asia-Kazakhstan" international committee: "The laboratory on the island is still operating." The statement was made in January 1992. I assume that my information about the "boarded-up" barracks would make one think that Shakhanov was right. Apparently the laboratory was "mothballed" in approximately the same way as the barracks were "boarded up." This assumption is reinforced by the fact that, as was stated in the article, beginning in 1992 scientific research work will be conducted on the island by the duty-shift method. This in a supposedly mothballed laboratory! Another quote: "In November 1991 at

a scientific conference in Sergiyev Posad a decision was adopted to finally terminate testing work on the island."

Has it never occurred to the readers of the article what kind of relationship the Moscow-area Sergiyev Posad (the former Zagorsk) has to the Aral? The most direct The fact is that Sergiyev Posad is where the command of the military unit quartered in Aralsk-5 is located. And when they set out for Moscow the entire division was offered a chance to continue their service in Sergiyev Posad, but the boys refused

But that is not the main thing. The main theme of the article was that the bacteriological testing ground is closed because of public protests. Is that true? As I went through the various levels of authority asking for my son and his men to be transferred out of Kazakhstan (a different country) to serve in Russia. I made my way to the Committee on Affairs of Military Servicemen under the president of Russia, where I was told plainly that the Russian higher military echelons had adopted a decision to transfer all Russian units out of the territories of the former Union republics

Moreover, the entire Aralsk-5 unit was gradually transferred to Russia, since Kazakhstan is creating its own army. Consequently, the closure of the "Sand Dune" is in no way linked to public protests

God forbid if along with the unit they were to move the sinister "Sand Dune" with its "mothballed" laboratory to the territory of Russia

NASA, CIA Visit Ukraine 'Top Secret' Center

LD2207123692 Moscow 11 4R-T 4SS in English 1225 GMT 22 Jul 92

[By UKRINFORM correspondent Sergey Kravchenko]

[Text] Dnepropetrovsk July 22 TASS—A group of experts from NASA, the CIA, the U.S. National Space Council and the Air Force visited a top secret space and missile centre "Yuzhnove" in Ukraine

They acquainted themselves with space craft designed there, watched documentaries on the launches of the missiles, visited design bureaus and productional facilities. They were mostly interested in the SS-18 strategic missile which was nicknamed "Satan" in the U.S. The missiles are to be scrapped according to agreements with the United States.

Director of the enterprise Leonid Kuchma and chief designer Stanislav Konyukhov offered several directions of cooperation to American guests, in particular, the creation of a unified missile system for rendering emergency aid to people in any part of the globe. Equipment to predict earthquakes can be also jointly produced

Ukraine, Germany Agree on Nuclear Inspection

AU2207105492 Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY in Ukrainian 16 July 92 p 4

[Commentary by Zhozef Shapoval, associate at the Scientific and Technological Center for Nuclear and Radiation Safety at Ukraine's State Atomic Inspection Office: "Atomic Electric Power Plants Will Be Inspected by Germans"]

[Text] International contacts established by Ukraine's State Atomic Inspection office are becoming increasingly strong.

The visit by the delegation from the German Federal Ministry of Environmental Protection, Nature Protection, and Nuclear Reactor Safety, and from the Society for Safety of Reactors was also fruitful.

A cooperation agreement has been reached between inspection bodies of the two countries on fostering the development of safety regulations at atomic electric power plants that operate in Ukraine and on organizing systematic training, exchange, and probation of the personnel.

The German colleagues are ready to give the necessary support in terms of providing stationary and mobile means of telecommunication, computers, and control and measurement instruments for ensuring efficient inspection of atomic power engineering facilities and for conducting research.

Specialists from Germany will take part in analyzing the safety of reactors at the Rivne Atomic Electric Power Plant and the Ukryttya [Shelter] facility and in checking the reliability of the system for locating accidents at atomic electric power plants.

An offer from the consortium of German firms to detect, with the help of modern technology, possible areas of contamination with radioactive waste was also discussed.

Byelarus Consent Needed To Use Nuclear Weapons

LD2407163992 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1211 GMT 24 Jul 92

[By BELINFORM correspondent Valentina Menshikova for TASS]

[Text] Minsk July 24 TASS—"It is impossible to use nuclear armaments temporarily remaining on the Byelarussian territory without the consent of the republic", according to Byelarusian Defence Minister Pavel Kozlovski.

This provision is included into a treaty signed with Russia on July 20, he said at a meeting with British military attache on Friday.

The treaty also envisages that strategic nuclear arms, which are to be withdrawn from Byelarus in seven years according to the Lisbon agreement, will be eliminated only in Russia, he added.

The treaty is not a military pact between two states and it is not aimed against third countries, according to Kozlovski. The document confirms the principles and provisions enclosed in the U.N. Charter.

It envisages that in case of aggression against one of the parties the other one promotes legal and political settlement of the conflict. Byelarus and Russia will hold consultations and use internationally-acknowledged mechanisms of settlement in case of an attack or a threat of aggression against each of them, the minister explained.

Byelarus, Russia Agree on N-Arms Coordination

OW2407123792 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1203 GMT 24 Jul 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The agreement between Byelarus and Russia on defence matters guarantees reliable coordination of all issues on the presence of nuclear weapons in Byelarus. The republican government circles single out as the main achievement just this point in the document, signed in Moscow on Monday by the Premier Vyacheslav Kebich and the acting head of the Russian cabinet Yegor Gaydar. It is noted that until recently, secret codes to control nuclear missiles launch were in the Russian President Boris Yeltsin's hands in Moscow. A new system, as sources close to the Byelarusian Parliament's leader believe, makes it technically impossible to launch strategic missiles without a joint decision.

Although concrete terms for the withdrawal of Russia's strategic forces from Byelarus were not agreed in Moscow, the delegations noted at their meeting that they must not be longer than seven years, as had been determined at the Lisbon conference. The documents signed in Russia are intended for only five years. They take effect after the ratification by both parliaments.

Byelarus To Trade Only Surplus Weapons

OW2707171892 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1635 GMT 27 Jul 92

[Report by Andrey Pershin, Andrey Petrovsky, and Vladimir Shishlin from "Presidential Bulletin"; transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] "Byelarus will sell only surpluses of its weapons", the first deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Michail Myasnikovich [name as received], an acting Prime Minister instead of Vyacheslav Kebich who has departed for Zheleznovodsk for rest, said in his exclusive interview with "IF" [INTERFAX].

"The Byelarusian Government considers trade in weapons and military equipment only as a means improving our economic situation", Myasnikovich added.

The first Vice Premier pointed out: "We have no intention to support any regimes and we shall not supply weapons and military equipment to the states which are on the point of a military conflict or where the socialpolitical situation is unstable".

Myasnikovich firmly excludes any trade bargains with nuclear weapons. According to Myasnikovich, this weapons "will be withdrawn from the Byelarusian territory and destroyed in accordance with agreements achieved". Tanks will be destined to trade in the first turn as there are about 3.5 thousand tanks in the republic, thus in 2 thousands exceeding the norm established by the Vienna agreements. The list of commodities to be sold includes engineering equipment, military aircraft. Myasnikovichh has reported that" intensive preparatory work in this direction is underway".

According to "IF", during his visit to Minsk President of Finland Mauno Koivisto was discussing with the Byelarusian leadership a possibility of sale of some military aircraft belonging to the Byelarusian Air Force to this Scandinavian state. Myasnikovich sees "no hindrances on the way to this bargain".

The first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers reported that Byelarus received many military orders from different states and some of them are being fulfilled already. In particular, the Byelarusian experts are introducing the newest systems of air traffic control in Cuba and India. They were ordered no only for the military but civil aviation as well.

"Is it worth in the process of conversion to thoughtlessly melt everything and to radically change the destiny of military industry's professionals?", Myasnikovich asks, and himself gives an answer: "It may occur the same way as it was during the battle with hard drinking in the USSR when the best vineyards of the country were mercilessly annihilated".

The first deputy chairman of the head of the government expressed his dissatisfaction in respect to the Russia's attitude to its obligations on payment for the production of military factories delivered from Belarus to Russia. He said that Russia has not paid to the Byelarusian military complex 5.5 billion rubles out of its 8-billion debt being promised several months ago.

Kazakhstan Denies Nuclear Links With Iran

LD2507184792 Tehran IRNA in English 1738 GMT 25 jul 92

[Text] Mosocw, July 25, IRNA—The Atomic Energy Agency of Kazakhstan said Saturday that contrary to a report in the Russian daily IZVESTIYA last week the agency had not sent any atomic energy consultant to Iran.

Deputy managing director of the agency Valerin Schumanskiy said in a telephone interview with IRNA Saturday that the agency near Alma-Ata of Kazakhstan engaged solely in studies on nuclear physics. He said the agency was "One of the countless similar reactors throughout the world which were being used exclusively for scientific and peaceful purposes."

Schumanskiy discounted the technical capacity of any reactor center anywhere in the world to produce nuclear weapons.

Commenting on IZVESTIYA's report, vice president of the Nuclear Physics Institute of Kazakhstan's Science Academy Gadlet Batyrbekov also reached by telephone said to IRNA today that his institute had not ever undertaken any project in the area of atomic weapons. He said that the atomic experts of the institute who had gone abroad could not possibly help other governments get access to atomic weapons because they did not have the necessary technical know-how.

Asked to comment on the same report in another telephone interview, Nikolay Larin head of the press office of Kazakhstan's president said he did not know anything about the existence of atomic weapons experts at the nuclear centers of Kazakhstan to begin with.

The Russian daily IZVESTIYA last week quoted Israeli sources as saying that a Kazakh atomic expert named Andre who worked in Israel had "become missing and unheard of and had gone to Iran."

Israeili sources, according to IZVESTIYA, have alleged that Iran is trying to lure "all experts of an atomic center in Alma-Ata of Kazakhstan for the purpose of producing atomic weapons."

GERMANY

German Experts To Examine Armenian Reactor

AU2407142292 Duesseldorf WIRTSCHAFTSWOCHE in German 24 Jul 92 p 12

["THE" report: "Armenia: Ruined Reactor Facing Reactiviation"]

[Text] The energy supply situation in besieged Armenia is so desperate that the government of the former Soviet republic intends to reactivate the nuclear reactor at Metsamor, which was closed down in 1998 and is about 20 km from Yerevan. The resistance of the worried population to putting the reactor into operation is weakening, since the country will not survive the winter without electricity from this ruined Chernobyl-type power plant.

A German economic delegation, which recently visted the country, promised that the reactor would be examined by German experts before it is reactivated.

NORWAY

Businessman Attempts To Sell Russian Heavy Water

LD2607160292 Oslo Radio Norway International in English 1300 GMT 26 Jul 92

[Text] A Norwegian businessman in the far northern town of Tromso has been contacting a number of foreign embassies in Oslo with offers to sell them Heavy Water from Russia. Tromso is a near-neighbor to Russia's Kola peninsula, which has one of the world's biggest concentrations of nuclear weapons. Legally, the businessman was within his rights. His offers were made in January—a law forbidding such sales was not made until February.

END OF FICHE DATE FILMED 12 August 1992